From owner-freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org Tue Oct 24 10:44:18 2017 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-hackers@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6B6CE48AD6; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 10:44:18 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from eric@metricspace.net) Received: from mail.metricspace.net (mail.metricspace.net [IPv6:2001:470:1f11:617::107]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7E74A7E4A4; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 10:44:18 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from eric@metricspace.net) Received: from [IPv6:2001:470:1f11:617:3210:b3ff:fe77:ca3f] (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:1f11:617:3210:b3ff:fe77:ca3f]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) (Authenticated sender: eric) by mail.metricspace.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 830983147; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 10:44:12 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: Trust system write-up To: Rozhuk Ivan , "Simon J. Gerraty" Cc: "freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org" , freebsd-arch@freebsd.org References: <1a9bbbf6-d975-0e77-b199-eb1ec0486c8a@metricspace.net> <20171023071120.GA72383@blogreen.org> <67125.1508777074@kaos.jnpr.net> <20171024040925.1918f3cb@rimwks> From: Eric McCorkle Message-ID: Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 06:44:12 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; FreeBSD amd64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.4.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20171024040925.1918f3cb@rimwks> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-BeenThere: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Technical Discussions relating to FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 10:44:18 -0000 On 10/23/2017 21:09, Rozhuk Ivan wrote: > On Mon, 23 Oct 2017 09:44:34 -0700 > "Simon J. Gerraty" wrote: > >> With the advent of secure boot and TPM's, there is potentially scope >> to allow for mixed control. > > TPM is closed hardware and software: you dont know what inside and how it works. > Secure boot same crap: closed source with many known security holes. > I think it's necessary to support secure boot for commercial vendors and such. I personally have no interest in Microsoft being able to certify random programs to boot on my machines, and am much more interested in things like coreboot. There are, however, secure boot mechanisms such as the Power architecture boot that maintain user control, and I'm hoping with the rise of RISC-V that we'll see trustworthy hardware crypto and TPM-like devices.