Date: Thu, 18 Nov 1999 16:31:41 -0500 From: "Timothy A. Musson" <Timothy.A.Musson@grc.nasa.gov> To: Jonathon McKitrick <jcm@dogma.freebsd-uk.eu.org> Cc: questions@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: secure filesystem wiping Message-ID: <199911182108.QAA22169@ssdmail.aero2k1.net> In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.4.02A.9911182103340.6933-100000@dogma.freebsd-uk. eu.org> References: <99Nov19.074604est.40354@border.alcanet.com.au>
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It *is* possible to write back garbage or 0xFF. The problem is that no matter how much you write over it, if someone *really* wants your data, they can get it (with physical access to the drive, of course). If destroying the drive is a problem, you either need to re-phrase the question to be, "what is the most secure way to obliterate files on FreeBSD, that still leaves the drive/filesystem intact?", or convince yourself to be happy with the level of security you get with over-writing. At 04:04 PM 11/18/99 , you wrote: >On Fri, 19 Nov 1999, Peter Jeremy wrote: > >>This isn't technically possible. You can't securely wipe data from a >>disk using the disks own R/W head/electronics (which is the only way >>to preserve intact files). > >Why isn't it possible to read unallocated sectors and write back sectors >full of garbage, or 0xFF? >-jm > > > >To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org >with "unsubscribe freebsd-questions" in the body of the message > To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-questions" in the body of the message
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