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Date:      Tue, 24 Apr 2001 20:20:35 -0400
From:      Daniel Hagan <dhagan@colltech.com>
To:        Dragos Ruiu <dr@kyx.net>
Cc:        Crist Clark <crist.clark@globalstar.com>, Domas Mituzas <domas.mituzas@delfi.lt>, scheidell@fdma.com, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Connection attempts (& active ids)
Message-ID:  <3AE61853.F8DEF42D@colltech.com>
References:  <20010423231908.N574-100000@axis.tdd.lt> <3AE4A5F2.E52825EE@globalstar.com> <01042318494515.00270@smp.kyx.net>

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Dragos Ruiu wrote:
> But it's probably better to have the honeypot
> mirror your normal configs to get the most value out of it and to
> make it less obviously different from your production system.

If a system mirrors your production configuration, it's no longer a
honeypot.  Honeypots must be easier to compromise than the production
systems or they can no longer fulfill their purpose (enticement of
attackers to a known location, so to speak, facilitating detection
and/or monitoring).

> I would even go as far in differing as to say that I expect honeypot
> systems to become a standard practice not just a "best" practice.  

Even after the legal issues surrounding honeypot use are more
thoroughly explored, I wouldn't expect to see non-research
organizations deploying them in any great numbers.  It really depends
on what your goals are.  If you want to entice an attacker into a
situation where he can be monitored and his tools captured, honeypots
are a good idea.  If you're charged with protecting certain information
or service assets from compromise, honeypots are not very effective.  A
well designed network with NIDS will give you higher quality and larger
quantities of intelligence regarding activity on your network than a
honeypot will.

> If nothing else, a honeypot makes a great use for a hot standby 
> spare...

I'll assume that you're kidding here.  You wouldn't really treat a
system *designed* to be compromised as a fail over resource if your
primary assets became unavailable, would you?  <shudder>

Daniel

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