Date: Wed, 29 Nov 1995 16:24:27 +0100 From: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@critter.tfs.com> To: "Andrew V. Stesin" <stesin@elvisti.kiev.ua> Cc: security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: chroot/setuid vs type enforcement (fwd) Message-ID: <423.817658667@critter.tfs.com> In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 29 Nov 1995 12:01:31 %2B0200." <199511291001.MAA15889@office.elvisti.kiev.ua>
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> Here are interesting thoughts about hardening security of chrooted > environment... > > # Let's examine one possiblity. Suppose I am using chroot() to > # protect my firewall. And the argument I want to make is that I want > # to be sure, for sure, that nobody can tweak a buffer overrun and > # call a socket from inside the chrooted area. Amongst other things in this context you need to spoof/handle: the actual pid of "PID==1", since you don't want them to send weird signals to init. /dev you probably don't even want them to be able to do a mknod... -- Poul-Henning Kamp | phk@FreeBSD.ORG FreeBSD Core-team. http://www.freebsd.org/~phk | phk@login.dknet.dk Private mailbox. whois: [PHK] | phk@ref.tfs.com TRW Financial Systems, Inc. Future will arrive by its own means, progress not so.
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