From owner-freebsd-security Mon Jul 1 9:31:12 2002 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.FreeBSD.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 73CF437B401 for ; Mon, 1 Jul 2002 09:31:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from lariat.org (lariat.org [63.229.157.2]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 786B343E0A for ; Mon, 1 Jul 2002 09:31:05 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from brett@lariat.org) Received: from mustang.lariat.org (IDENT:ppp1000.lariat.org@lariat.org [63.229.157.2]) by lariat.org (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA05234; Mon, 1 Jul 2002 10:30:52 -0600 (MDT) X-message-flag: Warning! Use of Microsoft Outlook is dangerous and makes your system susceptible to Internet worms. Message-Id: <4.3.2.7.2.20020701102105.022a44f0@localhost> X-Sender: brett@localhost X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2 Date: Mon, 01 Jul 2002 10:30:44 -0600 To: David Pick , security@FreeBSD.ORG From: Brett Glass Subject: Re: security risk: ktrace(2) in FreeBSD prior to -current. In-Reply-To: References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk List-ID: List-Archive: (Web Archive) List-Help: (List Instructions) List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Loop: FreeBSD.org At 08:43 AM 7/1/2002, David Pick wrote: >At least we can build a binary update "package" >for the "ports" version using a simple "make package"; it's >harder for the version integrated into the base. You can make a binary updater using the currently available port. Just do cd /usr/ports/security/openssh-portable && make -DOPENSSH_OVERWRITE_BASE package Beware, though, that you'll also want to install the latest OpenSSL "engine". I believe that you can make this into a binary package as well. >Please note that I have *not* asked for a binary update. >I don't want to get flamed the way Brett does... ...for asking something reasonable? ;-) Seriously: Please do ask. If we do not have up-to-date binary packages, a large percentage of the new installs of FreeBSD (both network installs and those from CD-ROM) will be vulnerable from the start, even though the holes have long been identified. This is not only unethical but also terrible for FreeBSD's reputation. Already, the Apache/FreeBSD worm is making the rounds. Why allow new installs to be vulnerable? --Brett To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message