Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 11:07:45 -0700 (PDT) From: Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> To: cvs-committers@FreeBSD.org, cvs-all@FreeBSD.org Subject: cvs commit: src/sys/security/mac_biba mac_biba.c mac_biba.h src/sys/security/mac_bsdextended mac_bsdextended.c mac_bsdextended.h src/sys/security/mac_ifoff mac_ifoff.c src/sys/security/mac_mls mac_mls.c mac_mls.h src/sys/security/mac_none mac_none.c ... Message-ID: <200207311807.g6VI7js2018615@freefall.freebsd.org>
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rwatson 2002/07/31 11:07:45 PDT
Added files:
sys/security/mac_biba mac_biba.c mac_biba.h
sys/security/mac_bsdextended mac_bsdextended.c
mac_bsdextended.h
sys/security/mac_ifoff mac_ifoff.c
sys/security/mac_mls mac_mls.c mac_mls.h
sys/security/mac_none mac_none.c
sys/security/mac_seeotheruids mac_seeotheruids.c
sys/security/mac_test mac_test.c
Log:
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Revision Changes Path
1.1 +2226 -0 src/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c (new)
1.1 +61 -0 src/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.h (new)
1.1 +749 -0 src/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c (new)
1.1 +60 -0 src/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.h (new)
1.1 +173 -0 src/sys/security/mac_ifoff/mac_ifoff.c (new)
1.1 +2177 -0 src/sys/security/mac_mls/mac_mls.c (new)
1.1 +61 -0 src/sys/security/mac_mls/mac_mls.h (new)
1.1 +1105 -0 src/sys/security/mac_none/mac_none.c (new)
1.1 +179 -0 src/sys/security/mac_seeotheruids/mac_seeotheruids.c (new)
1.1 +1311 -0 src/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c (new)
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