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Date:      Thu, 21 Jun 2001 12:34:17 +0300
From:      Peter Pentchev <roam@orbitel.bg>
To:        cjclark@alum.mit.edu
Cc:        Malcolm <malcolm@ocf.berkeley.edu>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: IPFilter and security
Message-ID:  <20010621123417.D772@ringworld.oblivion.bg>
In-Reply-To: <20010620215300.C740@blossom.cjclark.org>; from cristjc@earthlink.net on Wed, Jun 20, 2001 at 09:53:00PM -0700
References:  <Pine.SOL.4.33.0106201809290.23365-100000@famine.OCF.Berkeley.EDU> <20010620215300.C740@blossom.cjclark.org>

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On Wed, Jun 20, 2001 at 09:53:00PM -0700, Crist J. Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 20, 2001 at 06:18:33PM -0700, Malcolm wrote:
> > Hi folks,
> >   What do we think about installing IPFilter on non-gateway boxes
> > and using it to block all incoming traffic except for whatever ports
> > we want to use on our server (e.g., http, ftp)?
> 
> Well, "we" (OK, just me) think that it depends entirely on the purpose
> of the box and your local security policies. There is no "right"
> answer. But some two things to consider:
> 
> If you have locked down services on a box and then firewall but allow
> access to these services, what are you protecting? What does the
> firewall actually do to hamper a remote attacker? It really does not
> add anything. However, closing up all services is not as easy as it
> sounds and a firewall is an extra layer of protection against mistakes
> in locking them down. IMHO, unless the box is security critical, the
> administrative costs of all of the firewalling probably exceeds the
> security gain for resisting external attack.
> 
> However, a firewall in this situation might protect you more from
> _local_ users. That is, local users cannot start listening daemons on
> high ports on their own. Again, depending on the site policy, this may
> be good or bad. If policy is that users are trusted and _should_ be
> able to do things like that, firewalling is bad. OTOH, if users are
> less trusted and policy forbids these things, firewalling is the best
> way to stop it.

Well, there is this little matter of never really being sure you've
locked down services on a box..  A firewall might help if a remote user
were to suddenly become a local user, in which case the arguments
in your last paragraph hold :)

G'luck,
Peter

-- 
This sentence claims to be an Epimenides paradox, but it is lying.

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