Date: Wed, 15 Oct 1997 15:07:38 -0700 (PDT) From: Brian Beattie <beattie@stt3.com> To: Narvi <narvi@haldjas.folklore.ee> Cc: benedict@echonyc.com, security@FreeBSD.ORG, Terry Lambert <tlambert@primenet.com> Subject: Re: C2 Trusted FreeBSD? Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.971015150134.4841A-100000@durin> In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.3.96.971015093743.9017C-100000@haldjas.folklore.ee>
next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
On Wed, 15 Oct 1997, Narvi wrote: > > On Wed, 15 Oct 1997, Snob Art Genre wrote: > > > On Tue, 14 Oct 1997, Chris Dillon wrote: > > > > <snip> > > > The point is, if someone stole your SIMMs out of your BOX to try and steal > > > data from them, they're out of luck.. If they steal what you THINK is a > > > totally blank hard drive or floppy disk that you previously wrote > > > sensitive data to, think again. This is why it is standard policy in some > > > places for drives that went south to not just be thrown away, but > > > completely destroyed with a sledge-hammer. :-) > > > > Or in other words - C2 or not, we are going to need a modified ffs that > properly overwrites the freed (via unlink, truncate or other means) > storage on disk anyways? > You only need this if you do not have physical security. If you do not have physicial security, you do not have security. Overwriting freed disk blocks is not needed at B3, nor do I think at A1. In truly secure environments disks, never leave. In slightly less secure environments, there are utilities to overwrite all the bits so a disk can be removed from the secure environment. Overwritting freed resources as a standard procedure is never needed.
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?Pine.GSO.3.95.971015150134.4841A-100000>