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Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 13:03:15 -0700 (PDT)
From: Nate Lawson <nate@root.org>
To: Jim Rees <rees@umich.edu>
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Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/usr.bin/enigma enigma.1 
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On Fri, 14 May 2004, Jim Rees wrote:
>   You may want to amend it into the 21st century regarding what the
>   alternatives are for "real" encryption -- perhaps replace all of the
>   mentioned alternatives with openssl(1), or just replace bdes(1)...
>
> You might also want to clarify that the encryption is a simple single rotor,
> not the more difficult (but still unsafe) German military Enigma.
>
> Someone should also fix the bdes(1) man page, which still says, "DES is
> considered a very strong cryptosystem" and "key search attacks... are very
> expensive and time-consuming."  Just taking out "very" in both places might
> be enough.  And add a pointer to openssl(1) for something stronger.

Oh yeah, besides the two Enigmas, we have one of those too.  It uses too
much power to turn on though.  :)

http://www.cryptography.com/resources/whitepapers/DES.html

-Nate