From owner-freebsd-security Mon Nov 13 11:34:00 1995 Return-Path: owner-security Received: (from root@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.6.12/8.6.6) id LAA21368 for security-outgoing; Mon, 13 Nov 1995 11:34:00 -0800 Received: from Root.COM (implode.Root.COM [198.145.90.17]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.6.12/8.6.6) with ESMTP id LAA21347 ; Mon, 13 Nov 1995 11:33:55 -0800 Received: from corbin.Root.COM (corbin [198.145.90.50]) by Root.COM (8.6.12/8.6.5) with ESMTP id LAA26943; Mon, 13 Nov 1995 11:33:53 -0800 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by corbin.Root.COM (8.6.12/8.6.5) with SMTP id LAA04201; Mon, 13 Nov 1995 11:29:39 -0800 Message-Id: <199511131929.LAA04201@corbin.Root.COM> To: Peter Wemm cc: ache@astral.msk.su, committers@freebsd.org, security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: cvs commit: CVSROOT log_accum.pl In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 14 Nov 95 02:26:45 +0800." From: David Greenman Reply-To: davidg@Root.COM Date: Mon, 13 Nov 1995 11:29:34 -0800 Sender: owner-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk >I wonder if this is really appropriate though. We are supposed to be >able to trust root or setuid programs (they can call reboot() after >all). I'm not convinced that making setlogin() fail for root is an >inherently safe operation... Agreed? setlogin() should not fail for root session leaders. >I suspect the ideal fix would be to change the semantics to use something >like the credentials system where it's reference counted and copy-on-write >when a process changes it. I suspect it would be better for new processes Gack. No, let's keep the current mechanism. >BTW: I suspect "struct ucred" should be reordered for better internal >alignment.. That's fine by me. -DG