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Date:      Sat, 24 Dec 2011 14:10:37 +0100
From:      =?iso-8859-2?Q?Edward_Tomasz_Napiera=B3a?= <trasz@FreeBSD.org>
To:        Andrey Chernov <ache@FreeBSD.ORG>
Cc:        src-committers@FreeBSD.ORG, Xin LI <delphij@gmail.com>, John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.ORG>, svn-src-all@FreeBSD.ORG, svn-src-head@FreeBSD.ORG, Colin Percival <cperciva@FreeBSD.ORG>, Kostik Belousov <kostikbel@gmail.com>, Alexander Kabaev <kabaev@gmail.com>
Subject:   Re: svn commit: r228843 - head/contrib/telnet/libtelnet head/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/libtelnet head/include head/lib/libc/gen head/lib/libc/iconv head/lib/libc/include head/lib/libc/net head/libexec...
Message-ID:  <8E5EE6FA-7BA1-4590-843A-F5C3C0493E5B@FreeBSD.org>
In-Reply-To: <20111224105045.GA11127@vniz.net>
References:  <201112231500.pBNF0c0O071712@svn.freebsd.org> <201112231058.46642.jhb@freebsd.org> <201112231122.34436.jhb@freebsd.org> <20111223120644.75fe944d@kan.dyndns.org> <20111223175143.GJ50300@deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua> <20111224100509.GA98136@vniz.net> <CAGMYy3s4YM-j165o9p%2BEDgMf0%2BaJq7gKj5yR=LK8_yfECnbtog@mail.gmail.com> <20111224103948.GA10939@vniz.net> <CAGMYy3vUMUi0ajADs2AdVRPfWQShmjfXDHfrKTFBmHGiNTWPFA@mail.gmail.com> <20111224105045.GA11127@vniz.net>

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Wiadomo=B6=E6 napisana przez Andrey Chernov w dniu 24 gru 2011, o godz. =
11:50:
> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 02:45:21AM -0800, Xin LI wrote:
>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 2:39 AM, Andrey Chernov <ache@freebsd.org> =
wrote:
>>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 02:26:20AM -0800, Xin LI wrote:
>>>> chroot(2) can create legitimate and secure environment where =
dlopen(2)
>>>> is safe and necessary.
>>>=20
>>> Yes, so ischroot() check can be used only into that places where =
libc's
>>> libc_dlopen() currently used, i.e. placed into libc_dlopen() itself.
>>=20
>> So it's Okay to break NSS in chroot jail?
>=20
> We need general solution. We simple can't count all possible and =
future=20
> ftpd's arround the world and insert =
__FreeBSD_libc_enter_restricted_mode()=20
> into them. I even not mention other programs that may use chroot() =
too. If=20
> some component like auth is critical for chroot, it should be =
restricted=20
> in general scope.

How about adding a check in dlopen(3) to make sure the file being opened
is owned either by us (getuid(3)) or root and is not writable by anyone =
else?=



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