From owner-freebsd-chat@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Jun 23 03:04:31 2003 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-chat@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4E9D37B401 for ; Mon, 23 Jun 2003 03:04:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mta05-svc.ntlworld.com (mta05-svc.ntlworld.com [62.253.162.45]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B58343FB1 for ; Mon, 23 Jun 2003 03:04:30 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from colin.percival@wadham.ox.ac.uk) Received: from piii600.wadham.ox.ac.uk ([81.103.196.4]) by mta05-svc.ntlworld.comESMTP <20030623100428.FJNW28183.mta05-svc.ntlworld.com@piii600.wadham.ox.ac.uk>; Mon, 23 Jun 2003 11:04:28 +0100 Message-Id: <5.0.2.1.1.20030623105821.02cfd9c0@popserver.sfu.ca> X-Sender: cperciva@popserver.sfu.ca X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.0.2 Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2003 11:04:15 +0100 To: ultraviolet@epweb.co.za, chat@freebsd.org From: Colin Percival In-Reply-To: <20030623072418.GF18653@tulip.epweb.co.za> References: <5.0.2.1.1.20030622084009.01c8d600@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030622044124.02cc0948@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030622022111.02c1cdf8@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030621193449.02c91ce8@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030621175853.02c92e00@popserver.sfu.ca> <20030621163835.GA18653@tulip.epweb.co.za> <5.0.2.1.1.20030621175853.02c92e00@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030621193449.02c91ce8@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030622022111.02c1cdf8@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030622044124.02cc0948@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030622084009.01c8d600@popserver.sfu.ca> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: Re: Cryptographically enabled ports tree. X-BeenThere: freebsd-chat@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Non technical items related to the community List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2003 10:04:32 -0000 At 09:24 23/06/2003 +0200, William Fletcher wrote: >No use signing if cvsup is a mess. False. If the ports tree is signed, people can verify its integrity regardless of how they obtain it. >We need cvsup-ssl, Then, all the big security guys need to do >is provide a public key for the cvsup-mirrors, which then get >the public key for the big cvsup server, etc. > >That way, cvsup is secure, and we can trust it. Not good enough. Cvsup-ssl would secure the cvsup process itself, but it would not protect against a malicious or damaged cvsup mirror. We need end-to-end signing -- the ports tree should be signed on freefall or cvsup-master, and verified by the end users. Colin Percival