Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2004 19:30:19 -0500 From: Frank Knobbe <frank@knobbe.us> To: hackers@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Booting encrypted Message-ID: <1095294619.633.206.camel@localhost> In-Reply-To: <200409072022.i87KM7Kf049770@wattres.Watt.COM> References: <200409072022.i87KM7Kf049770@wattres.Watt.COM>
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--=-Ju6X22j4rxtHuheldqk6 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Tue, 2004-09-07 at 15:22, Steve Watt wrote: > Having the password compiled in to something that's necessarily clear-tex= t > on the same media? Sorry for being late... I'm still catching up on piles of email :) Instead of having a plaintext password on the same media, how about a mechanism that reads the CPU's serial number, or some other hardware dependent number that can not be read by users on a system. If the drive gets removed from the system, the attacker would have a challenge. Of course you have to be careful before you replace failed hardware that is used to derive the key :) Don't replace the failed CPU before you decrypted... no wait... uhm... :) Okay, how about an offline copy of the number in case of hardware failure... :) Seriously though, tying the boot process to a hardware dependent value that is not accessible from within the booted system might be something to consider.=20 Any thoughts? Regards, Frank --=-Ju6X22j4rxtHuheldqk6 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name=signature.asc Content-Description: This is a digitally signed message part -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (FreeBSD) iD8DBQBBSN6bJjGc5ftAw8wRAkDBAJ4mkmkrgooun82LbbF22zNeuX6duwCdE2O8 LHTMD7QA9YGj/2zq18EuW9A= =DMmR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-Ju6X22j4rxtHuheldqk6--
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