From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Sat Jan 16 00:13:45 2010 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 199FD106566B for ; Sat, 16 Jan 2010 00:13:45 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from oz@nixil.net) Received: from nixil.net (nixil.net [161.58.222.1]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D4C088FC24 for ; Sat, 16 Jan 2010 00:13:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from demigorgon.corp.verio.net (fw.oremut02.us.wh.verio.net [198.65.168.24]) (authenticated bits=0) by nixil.net (8.13.6.20060614/8.13.6) with ESMTP id o0FNoWuQ046970 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 15 Jan 2010 16:50:39 -0700 (MST) Message-ID: <4B50FF48.2070801@nixil.net> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2010 16:50:32 -0700 From: Phil Oleson User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (X11/20090619) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.2 (nixil.net [161.58.222.1]); Fri, 15 Jan 2010 16:50:40 -0700 (MST) X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.95.2 at nixil.net X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sat, 16 Jan 2010 02:32:05 +0000 Subject: sendmail 8.14.4 X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2010 00:13:45 -0000 I'm seeing this in the release notes for the latest release of sendmail, plus a customers PCI scan is reporting this as a problem. I know many of these scans tend to do version string checks and don't actually check if the problem is possible to exploit, but I just wanted your thoughts on if this is something the security team feels it needs to deal with or not? -Phil. 8.14.4/8.14.4 2009/12/30 SECURITY: Handle bogus certificates containing NUL characters in CNs by placing a string indicating a bad certificate in the {cn_subject} or {cn_issuer} macro. Patch inspired by Matthias Andree's changes for fetchmail.