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Thu, 31 Jul 2025 07:19:11 -0700 (PDT) List-Id: Commit messages for all branches of the src repository List-Archive: https://lists.freebsd.org/archives/dev-commits-src-all List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-BeenThere: dev-commits-src-all@freebsd.org Sender: owner-dev-commits-src-all@FreeBSD.org MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <202507211410.56LEAD6J066633@gitrepo.freebsd.org> <47C3CC37-6F32-4376-900A-B5387B9817D5@freebsd.org> <20250721144645.3BA391BE@slippy.cwsent.com> <20250722155941.AC7EB121@slippy.cwsent.com> In-Reply-To: From: Rick Macklem Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2025 07:18:59 -0700 X-Gm-Features: Ac12FXzJh1KT6sG_nwZlklpW7_g7t7TBP_wxA2zdKZX2XsRjQVe9JorK6FuFeBc Message-ID: Subject: Re: git: c7da9fb90b0b - main - KRB5: Enable MIT KRB5 by default To: Benjamin Kaduk Cc: Konstantin Belousov , Cy Schubert , Jessica Clarke , Cy Schubert , "src-committers@freebsd.org" , "dev-commits-src-all@freebsd.org" , "dev-commits-src-main@freebsd.org" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-4.00 / 15.00]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-1.000]; NEURAL_HAM_MEDIUM(-1.00)[-1.000]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-1.00)[-0.999]; DMARC_POLICY_ALLOW(-0.50)[gmail.com,none]; R_SPF_ALLOW(-0.20)[+ip6:2a00:1450:4000::/36]; R_DKIM_ALLOW(-0.20)[gmail.com:s=20230601]; MIME_GOOD(-0.10)[text/plain]; ARC_NA(0.00)[]; FREEMAIL_TO(0.00)[gmail.com]; RCVD_TLS_LAST(0.00)[]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+]; DWL_DNSWL_NONE(0.00)[gmail.com:dkim]; TO_DN_EQ_ADDR_SOME(0.00)[]; FREEMAIL_FROM(0.00)[gmail.com]; TO_DN_SOME(0.00)[]; TAGGED_FROM(0.00)[]; DKIM_TRACE(0.00)[gmail.com:+]; FREEMAIL_ENVFROM(0.00)[gmail.com]; MID_RHS_MATCH_FROMTLD(0.00)[]; TO_MATCH_ENVRCPT_SOME(0.00)[]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; FREEMAIL_CC(0.00)[gmail.com,cschubert.com,freebsd.org]; MLMMJ_DEST(0.00)[dev-commits-src-all@freebsd.org,dev-commits-src-main@freebsd.org]; ASN(0.00)[asn:15169, ipnet:2a00:1450::/32, country:US]; RCPT_COUNT_SEVEN(0.00)[8]; MISSING_XM_UA(0.00)[]; RCVD_COUNT_ONE(0.00)[1]; RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE(0.00)[2a00:1450:4864:20::52e:from] X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 4btB6H1gRZz3FvS X-Spamd-Bar: --- On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 6:51=E2=80=AFAM Rick Macklem wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 6:07=E2=80=AFAM Rick Macklem wrote: > > > > On Wed, Jul 30, 2025 at 9:24=E2=80=AFPM Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 30, 2025 at 10:36=E2=80=AFAM Rick Macklem wrote: > > >> > > >> On Mon, Jul 28, 2025 at 3:32=E2=80=AFPM Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > > >> > > > >> > On Mon, Jul 28, 2025 at 3:04=E2=80=AFPM Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> Note that MIT krb5 provides the gss_krb5_export_lucid_sec_context= () API that does a lot of the work of getting useful bits out of an establi= shed GSS security context. > > >> >> > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > And a bit more context on what is going on here and why kgssapi ha= s to care: > > >> > The GSS-API (RFC 2743) is all about a way to "establish a security= context" (i.e., do crypto negotiation, authentication, sometimes authoriza= tion, etc.) between two entities, the initiator and the acceprot, and then = exchanging protected messages between the two (which can be either encrypte= d or just integrity protection tags for otherweise cleartext data); later e= xtensions included the ability to produce identical PRF output on both part= ies, etc.. The details are "mechanism-specific", and for this purpose we'r= e exclusively talking about the krb5 mechanism. The steps to establish the= security context are complicated and sometimes fiddly, and in the general = case can require a large number of round-trips between the initiator and ac= ceptor before the security context is established. The individual message-= protection parts are comparatively simple and amendable to implementation i= n the kernel for processing efficiency. > > >> > RFC 2743 also defines functions for GSS_Export_sec_context() and G= SS_Import_sec_context(), that are designed essentially to pass information = about an established security context from one process to another on the sa= me machine (which are presumably using the same implementation and version = of the implementation), so the contents of the exported blob are opaque and= implementation-specific. We are abusing that mechanism to export informat= ion about the security context that gssd has established and feed that info= rmation into the kernel implementation of the per-message processing routin= es. At present, this necessarily entails knowing the details of the implem= entation-specific opaque blob that is the "export sec context token", which= is what the sys/kgssapi/krb5/krb5_mech.c code is doing. But if we can get= the information we want without breaking the abstraction barrier, such as = via the gss_krb5_export_lucid_sec_context() API, we are in a more robust po= sture overall and somewhat future-proofed against future evolution by MIT k= rb5. > > >> > (I note that recent Heimdal versions seem to also expose a gss_krb= 5_export_lucid_sec_context() API, so part of the problem is just that the H= eimdal in base is so old.) > > >> > > >> Well, here's some "not so good" news... > > >> I've been trying to use gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(..) with the = oid > > >> for the GSS_KRB5_EXPORT_LUCID_SEC_CONTEXT_OID with version 1. > > >> It kept failing. > > >> The problem seems to be that "gctx->proto =3D=3D 4" in make_external= _lucid_ctx_v1() > > >> function. This function only knows about the 0 and 1 setting for gct= x->proto. > > >> > > >> Any ideas, rick > > >> > > > > > > > > > I'm not seeing anything to suggest that a "gctx->proto" value of 4 is= ever expected; it looks like it's supposed to just be 0 (for the legacy RF= C 1964 format) or 1 (for the "CFX" format of RFC 4121, with wider sequence = numbers for message-protection formats, etc.). So maybe it's worth posting= your current WIP somewhere to take a closer look at what's going on. > > > > Yea, the debugging I did was flawed (I probably got the wrong offset > > in the structure). > > It is weird, though. If I do gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(&minor, ctx= , > > OID_FOR_GSS_INQUIRE_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &key), it > > works and gives me the key and encryption type. > > > > If I do the same, but with the 12 byte OID for LUCID v1 (the 11 bytes f= rom the > > string + a 1 byte), it returns major =3D=3D GSS_S_COMPLETE, but no data= and > > a weird 39756046(decimal) or 0x25ea10e(hex) minor. > > (Oh, and I tried gss_krb5_export_lucid_sec_context() and got the same > > weird error.) > --> Now (after doing a "make buildworld"), gss_krb5_export_lucid_sec_cont= ext() > returns GSS_S_BAD_MECH. Looking at the src, that error has to be fro= m > gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(). So, same function fails, but a dif= ferent > error return? > > It looks like "gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type)" is failing. > I'm currently just passing GSS_C_NULL_OID into gss_init_sec_context(), > but I've also tried the Kerberos 9 byte OID (both work, in the sense that > gss_init_sec_context() seems to work, except that the actual_mech_type > returned by it has a bogus pointer in the reply). > --> It looks like the "mech_type" field of "ctx" is busted, for some reas= on? > > I'm going to try building krb5 from ports and linking to that, to see if = it > does the same thing. Finally some good news... All I did was "pkg install krb5" and then linked the gssd to the libraries = in /usr/local/lib and it worked!! Now I can test/debug the changes. Btw, the stuff in /usr/local/include/gssapi are correct and not messed up like the stuff in /usr/include/gssapi. (The ones in /usr/local/include defi= ne GSS_DLLIMP for example.) I'm going to leave figuring out why the libraries in /usr/lib are messed up to someone else. rick > > rick > > > > > Also, if I look at the actual_mech_type returned by gss_init_sec_contex= t(), > > I get an instant crash, because the "elements" pointer cannot be > > accessed (this doesn't much matter, since the info should always be jus= t > > the Kerberos OID). > > --> I suspect there is some problem w.r.t. how the libraries are being = built? > > > > I'm now building from sources to try and dig into the library functions= . > > > > rick > > > > > > > > From your previous message, > > > > > > > I am working on using gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(), which I thi= nk is just a front-end to gss_krb5_export_lucid_sec_context()? If that does= n't work, I'll switch to gss_krb5_export_lucid_sec_context(). (I am still w= aiting for the day when there is another mechanism. I have heard rumblings = w.r.t. a mechanism for the Oauth stuff, but as far as I know, about all tha= t they did was define an OID for it.) > > > > > > It looks like a front-end to the same core implementation at least (t= echnically not a wrapper for the public API, though). > > > (There are a bunch of non-krb5 mechanisms, most not in terribly wides= pread use.) > > > > > > > Btw, do you have any experience porting KDC databases from Heimdal = to MIT? (At this point, Cy has done it, but after doing so, the passwords a= ll had to be reset. He thought he had used "--decrypt" when he dumped the H= eimdal KDC.) > > > > > > I do not have such experience, but the conventional way to do it invo= lves an unencrypted dump (which I presume is what the aforementioned "--dec= rypt" does). Heimdal and MIT use (or at least used, the last time I looked= ) different techniques for encrypting the per-principal data in the dump fi= le, so a trip through plaintext helps. I do remember reading about Heimdal= having grown some support for the MIT database format; the commit message = at https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/commit/57f1545a46fdad9207a71903a56f3c= 1d1fff3a10 is perhaps a very high-level description of what is expected to = be possible. > > > > > > -Ben