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Elsukov" Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 10:18:00 +0000 (UTC) To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-projects@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r308971 - projects/ipsec/sys/netipsec X-SVN-Group: projects MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-src-projects@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: "SVN commit messages for the src " projects" tree" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 10:18:02 -0000 Author: ae Date: Tue Nov 22 10:18:00 2016 New Revision: 308971 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/308971 Log: Update key_allocsa() to reflect changes in SADB. Use SPI hash table for inbound SA lookup. Modified: projects/ipsec/sys/netipsec/key.c Modified: projects/ipsec/sys/netipsec/key.c ============================================================================== --- projects/ipsec/sys/netipsec/key.c Tue Nov 22 10:09:04 2016 (r308970) +++ projects/ipsec/sys/netipsec/key.c Tue Nov 22 10:18:00 2016 (r308971) @@ -871,92 +871,59 @@ key_allocsa_policy(struct secpolicy *sp, * keep source address in IPsec SA. We see a tricky situation here. */ struct secasvar * -key_allocsa(union sockaddr_union *dst, u_int proto, u_int32_t spi, - const char* where, int tag) +key_allocsa(union sockaddr_union *dst, uint8_t proto, uint32_t spi) { - struct secashead *sah; + SAHTREE_RLOCK_TRACKER; struct secasvar *sav; - u_int stateidx, arraysize, state; - const u_int *saorder_state_valid; -#ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T - int natt_chkport; -#endif + int chkport; IPSEC_ASSERT(dst != NULL, ("null dst address")); - KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, - printf("DP %s from %s:%u\n", __func__, where, tag)); - -#ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T - natt_chkport = (dst->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && - dst->sa.sa_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) && - dst->sin.sin_port != 0); -#endif - + chkport = 0; + SAHTREE_RLOCK(); + LIST_FOREACH(sav, SAVHASH_HASH(spi), spihash) { + if (sav->spi == spi) + break; + } /* - * searching SAD. - * XXX: to be checked internal IP header somewhere. Also when - * IPsec tunnel packet is received. But ESP tunnel mode is - * encrypted so we can't check internal IP header. + * We use single SPI namespace for all protocols, so it is + * impossible to have SPI duplicates in the SAVHASH. + * XXXAE: this breaks TCP_SIGNATURE. */ - SAHTREE_LOCK(); - if (V_key_preferred_oldsa) { - saorder_state_valid = saorder_state_valid_prefer_old; - arraysize = _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_valid_prefer_old); - } else { - saorder_state_valid = saorder_state_valid_prefer_new; - arraysize = _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_valid_prefer_new); - } - LIST_FOREACH(sah, &V_sahtree, chain) { - int checkport; - - /* search valid state */ - for (stateidx = 0; stateidx < arraysize; stateidx++) { - state = saorder_state_valid[stateidx]; - LIST_FOREACH(sav, &sah->savtree[state], chain) { - /* sanity check */ - KEY_CHKSASTATE(sav->state, state, __func__); - /* do not return entries w/ unusable state */ - if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE && - sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) - continue; - if (proto != sav->sah->saidx.proto) - continue; - if (spi != sav->spi) - continue; - checkport = 0; + if (sav != NULL) { #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T - /* - * Really only check ports when this is a NAT-T - * SA. Otherwise other lookups providing ports - * might suffer. - */ - if (sav->natt_type && natt_chkport) - checkport = 1; -#endif -#if 0 /* don't check src */ - /* check src address */ - if (key_sockaddrcmp(&src->sa, - &sav->sah->saidx.src.sa, checkport) != 0) - continue; -#endif - /* check dst address */ - if (key_sockaddrcmp(&dst->sa, - &sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa, checkport) != 0) - continue; - sa_addref(sav); - goto done; - } - } + /* + * Really only check ports when this is a NAT-T + * SA. Otherwise other lookups providing ports + * might suffer. + */ + chkport = (sav->natt_type != 0 && + dst->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && + dst->sa.sa_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) && + dst->sin.sin_port != 0); +#endif + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL && + sav->sah->saidx.proto == proto && + key_sockaddrcmp(&dst->sa, &sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa, + chkport) == 0) + SAV_ADDREF(sav); + else + sav = NULL; } - sav = NULL; -done: - SAHTREE_UNLOCK(); + SAHTREE_RUNLOCK(); - KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, - printf("DP %s return SA:%p; refcnt %u\n", __func__, - sav, sav ? sav->refcnt : 0)); - return sav; + if (sav == NULL) { + KEYDBG(IPSEC_STAMP, + char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; + printf("%s: SA not found for spi %u proto %u dst %s\n", + __func__, ntohl(spi), proto, ipsec_address(dst, buf, + sizeof(buf)))); + } else { + KEYDBG(IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("%s: return SA(%p)\n", __func__, sav)); + KEYDBG(IPSEC_DATA, kdebug_secasv(sav)); + } + return (sav); } struct secasvar *