Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 14:59:31 +0100 From: Igor Mozolevsky <igor@hybrid-lab.co.uk> To: George Mitchell <george+freebsd@m5p.com> Cc: Hackers freeBSD <freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org> Subject: Re: WPA2 attack? Message-ID: <CADWvR2hR_u93MDFPwMv025nMPcekSQEFvEcov-yhsbfcUt1s8A@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <9cc89278-17dc-d6a0-5cab-1a02fd6a5036@m5p.com> References: <9cc89278-17dc-d6a0-5cab-1a02fd6a5036@m5p.com>
next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
On 16 October 2017 at 14:51, George Mitchell <george+freebsd@m5p.com> wrote: > Is our community working on mitigating this problem? > https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/ > 10/severe-flaw-in-wpa2-protocol-leaves-wi-fi-traffic- > open-to-eavesdropping/ It's quite FUD-dy, from their conference paper at https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/ccs2017.pdf: 3.2 The Key Reinstallation Attack Our key reinstallation attack is now easy to spot: because the supplicant still accepts retransmissions of message 3, even when it is in the PTK-DONE state, we can force a reinstallation of the PTK. More precisely, we first establish a man-in-the-middle (MitM) position between the supplicant and authenticator. We use this MitM position to trigger retransmissions of message 3 by preventing message 4 from arriving at the authenticator. As a result, it will retransmit message 3, which causes the supplicant to reinstall an already-in-use PTK. -- Igor M.
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?CADWvR2hR_u93MDFPwMv025nMPcekSQEFvEcov-yhsbfcUt1s8A>