Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000 23:52:15 -0800 From: "Crist J. Clark" <cjclark@reflexnet.net> To: John Howie <JHowie@msn.com> Cc: Kurt Seifried <seifried@securityportal.com>, Alfred Perlstein <bright@wintelcom.net>, Moses Backman III <penguinjedi@home.com>, Todd Backman <todd@flyingcroc.net>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: woah Message-ID: <20001218235214.B96105@149.211.6.64.reflexcom.com> In-Reply-To: <017a01c06928$9e20ec60$9207c00a@local>; from JHowie@msn.com on Mon, Dec 18, 2000 at 11:27:52AM -0800 References: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0012172347240.48779-100000@security1.noc.flyingcroc.net> <20001218133716.A550@cg22413-a.adubn1.nj.home.com> <20001218104954.B19572@fw.wintelcom.net> <005a01c06924$77186340$ca00030a@seifried.org> <017a01c06928$9e20ec60$9207c00a@local>
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On Mon, Dec 18, 2000 at 11:27:52AM -0800, John Howie wrote: > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Kurt Seifried" <seifried@securityportal.com> > To: "Alfred Perlstein" <bright@wintelcom.net>; "Moses Backman III" > <penguinjedi@home.com> > Cc: "Todd Backman" <todd@flyingcroc.net>; <freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG> > Sent: Monday, December 18, 2000 10:58 AM > Subject: Re: woah > > > > Stupid question but why did you send this to me and a mailing list, etc? > > > > > Kurt, I was pretty disappointed to see this article. If you tear > > > it down the to base content, the only problem with SSL/SSH is stupid > > > users. > > > > And the fact that SSL/SSH rely on said stupid users. Usually the weakest > link... > > > > I find the references (here and elsewhere) to stupid users as troubling. > Most users are inexperienced, not stupid, and are certainly not clued up on > Security. Their main focus is getting their work done and not knowing what > it means when some obscure message pops up that lets them proceed even > though they should not. No, they are stupid. After Melissa, after LoveLetter, etc., every friggin' person on the planet knows they should not run untrusted executables they get in the mail, right? So why did I have to clean the Hybris worm off of two users' notebooks last week after they ran a executable they got from some random 'sexyfun.net' account with a subject line about Snowwhite and the Seven Dwarves. They had to save it out of their mail to disk and then run the damn thing even. Actually, I think it is not just stupidity but two factors, (1) stupidity and (2) the nothing-bad-would-ever-happen-to-me mindset. I think they are the same people who never wear seatbelts 'cause they are good drivers and they'll never be in an accident. Grade A, Darwin Award Winning Idiots. > No, the problem is STUPID PROGRAMMERS. We should > write our applications so that users cannot proceed in such circumstances. No way. You want the frantic, pissed off calls all day because, "I can't get on the server!" If you were to lock them out completely, some ingenous moron would figure out a way to get around it that is even more insecure than the alternatives (delete his whole known-keys file instead of just clearing the one conflicting line out). Just like how the default SSH won't let them procede unless they delete the mismatched keys manually. Hopefully the truly kewless will not be able to figure it out. > The only reason that we build applications so that users can proceed is that > 99% of the time the reason the keys have changed/the certificate does not > match the server is because we have reconfigured our systems thus > invalidating (or losing) the keys and certificates and it is perfectly safe > to proceed. Maybe I should add STUPID ADMINISTRATORS to the list here. Plenty of those too. More likely, the keys were lost when on a Saturday afternoon clueless luser VP could not get his email and called clueless IS manager who proceded to fix it on his own initiative. He done fix it real good. Reinstalled the operating system, pulled the hard drive out of the box without shutting down, or some other brilliant solution (yes, seen them all). > It is easy to blame one or more of users, programmers, and administrators > for weak security but until we have the science perfected we all have to > work together. Nah, I could get the computers at the office into some really tight, secure shape if it weren't for the damn humans they tell me I have to let use them. -- Crist J. Clark cjclark@alum.mit.edu To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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