From owner-freebsd-bugs@FreeBSD.ORG Sun Jun 8 23:36:45 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-bugs@FreeBSD.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [8.8.178.115]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8C21D88A for ; Sun, 8 Jun 2014 23:36:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kenobi.freebsd.org (kenobi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::16:76]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7414D23AD for ; Sun, 8 Jun 2014 23:36:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bugs.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.118]) by kenobi.freebsd.org (8.14.8/8.14.8) with ESMTP id s58Najvs042151 for ; Mon, 9 Jun 2014 00:36:45 +0100 (BST) (envelope-from bz-noreply@freebsd.org) From: bz-noreply@freebsd.org To: freebsd-bugs@FreeBSD.org Subject: [Bug 121073] [kernel] [patch] run chroot as an unprivileged user Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 23:36:45 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: AssignedTo X-Bugzilla-Type: changed X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Product: Base System X-Bugzilla-Component: kern X-Bugzilla-Version: 8.0-CURRENT X-Bugzilla-Keywords: X-Bugzilla-Severity: Affects Only Me X-Bugzilla-Who: Jille@quis.cx X-Bugzilla-Status: In Discussion X-Bugzilla-Priority: Normal X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: freebsd-bugs@FreeBSD.org X-Bugzilla-Target-Milestone: --- X-Bugzilla-Flags: X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Bugzilla-URL: https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: freebsd-bugs@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: Bug reports List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 23:36:45 -0000 https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=121073 --- Comment #7 from Jille@quis.cx --- I remember someone saying this could be exploited using rfork. I don't know why it's not listed in this bug. IIRC the problem was that fd_rdir (root of the processes) was stored in proc->p_fd (struct filedesc) and the P_NOSUGID-flag in struct proc itself. One could use rfork to create a new process with the same descriptor table and call chroot in the child which would flag the child with P_NOSUGID but change to root for the parent as well. The parent doesn't get P_NOSUGID however and will be able to execve a setuid executable with a fake libc. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are the assignee for the bug.