Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1999 20:25:43 -0500 (EST) From: Kelly Yancey <kbyanc@posi.net> To: Warner Losh <imp@village.org> Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: kernel stack contents visible from userland Message-ID: <Pine.BSF.4.05.9911172021110.18418-100000@kronos.alcnet.com> In-Reply-To: <199911172221.PAA19404@harmony.village.org>
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On Wed, 17 Nov 1999, Warner Losh wrote: > These patches look good. I wonder if there might be an easier way to > accomplish this. I don't see anything here that is a security risk, > per se, since most of the stat struct is always filled in before the > copyout. Which fields in stat are not explicitly used? I would have > expected them all to be filled in in all cases. It would likely be > faster to just wonk on st_lspare and st_qspare[2] in cvstat... > I wrote new patches which were less intrusive and only cleared the spare fields rather than bzero'ing the entire structure. I've submitted the patches with PR kern/14966. On a related note, these patches still solve my original problem of being able to compare stat structures. I found that, at least on FreeBSD/i386, I can reliably memcmp() two stat structures and determine when a file's status has changed (even on filesystems without ctime). All is right in the world. :) Thanks for the feedback, Kelly -- Kelly Yancey - kbyanc@posi.net - Richmond, VA Director of Technical Services, ALC Communications http://www.alcnet.com/ Maintainer, BSD Driver Database http://www.posi.net/freebsd/drivers/ Coordinator, Team FreeBSD http://www.posi.net/freebsd/Team-FreeBSD/ To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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