From owner-freebsd-current Sun Jul 23 1: 2:33 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from critter.freebsd.dk (flutter.freebsd.dk [212.242.40.147]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42D0C37B746; Sun, 23 Jul 2000 01:02:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from phk@critter.freebsd.dk) Received: from critter.freebsd.dk (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by critter.freebsd.dk (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA02771; Sun, 23 Jul 2000 10:02:16 +0200 (CEST) (envelope-from phk@critter.freebsd.dk) To: Kris Kennaway Cc: "Jeroen C. van Gelderen" , Mark Murray , current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak In-reply-to: Your message of "Sat, 22 Jul 2000 17:41:15 PDT." Date: Sun, 23 Jul 2000 10:02:16 +0200 Message-ID: <2769.964339336@critter.freebsd.dk> From: Poul-Henning Kamp Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG In message , Kri s Kennaway writes: >On Sat, 22 Jul 2000, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: > >> I agree that you need long RSA keys ... but the real >> discussion isn't really about key length but rather about >> the overall complexity of attacking the key: > >Okay, using RSA keys wasn't the best example to pick, but Yarrow also >seems easy to misuse in other cases: for example if you want to generate >multiple 256-bit symmetric keys (or other random data) at the same time, Kris, Obviously, if you need more randomness than a stock FreeBSD system can provide you with, you add hardware to give you more randomness. In other words, and more bluntly: Please shut up now, will you ? -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD coreteam member | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message