From owner-freebsd-security Thu Nov 11 15:22:10 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from nemesis.psionic.com (mcn-0220.aus.tx.bbnow.net [24.219.84.220]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CCEA014F02 for ; Thu, 11 Nov 1999 15:22:02 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from crowland@psionic.com) Received: from dolemite.psionic.com (unknown [192.168.2.10]) by nemesis.psionic.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE88C51B5; Thu, 11 Nov 1999 17:40:19 -0600 (CST) Date: Thu, 11 Nov 1999 17:21:12 -0600 (CST) From: "Craig H. Rowland" To: Brett Glass Cc: security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Why not sandbox BIND? In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.19991111160840.042469d0@localhost> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org BIND 8.x allows one to chroot() it very easily. There are even built in command line options to facilitate this. I wrote a quick document up on how to do this for OpenBSD a while back. Since they now run BIND chroot()ed by default now it may be moot, but still contains useful information that apply directly to the FreeBSD platform. Such a simple precaution as running BIND in a chroot() area can really prevent a lot of problems if something goes wrong. I personally wouldn't run BIND without this protection. http://www.psionic.com/papers/dns/dns-openbsd/ -- Craig On Thu, 11 Nov 1999, Brett Glass wrote: > OpenBSD sandboxes BIND, which means that most of the vulnerabilities in the > CERT advisory would be moot. > > Should the same be done by default in FreeBSD? There's no reason for BIND > to be privileged. > > --Brett > > > > To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org > with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message > To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message