From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Fri Jan 5 16:40:53 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C6FEEB30CB; Fri, 5 Jan 2018 16:40:53 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from nwhitehorn@freebsd.org) Received: from c.mail.sonic.net (c.mail.sonic.net [64.142.111.80]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5067171044; Fri, 5 Jan 2018 16:40:52 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from nwhitehorn@freebsd.org) Received: from comporellon.tachypleus.net (cpe-75-82-218-62.socal.res.rr.com [75.82.218.62]) (authenticated bits=0) by c.mail.sonic.net (8.15.1/8.15.1) with ESMTPSA id w05GeeDm023309 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NOT); Fri, 5 Jan 2018 08:40:40 -0800 Subject: Re: Intel hardware bug To: =?UTF-8?Q?C_Bergstr=c3=b6m?= , Eric McCorkle Cc: FreeBSD Hackers , "freebsd-arch@freebsd.org" , Shawn Webb , Freebsd Security , Poul-Henning Kamp , "Ronald F. Guilmette" , =?UTF-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=c3=b8rgrav?= , Brett Glass , Jules Gilbert References: <736a2b77-d4a0-b03f-8a6b-6a717f5744d4@metricspace.net> <2594.1515141192@segfault.tristatelogic.com> <809675000.867372.1515146821354@mail.yahoo.com> <250f3a77-822b-fba5-dcd7-758dfec94554@metricspace.net> From: Nathan Whitehorn Message-ID: Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 08:40:39 -0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; FreeBSD amd64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-Sonic-CAuth: UmFuZG9tSVZILE4do3EwanuIbHwb+oXQqQMbU4e5/RAi1Rs7bbWb8We8TNMbM+6jFRuna3/GZxymxTMek3deOLiPVdx5Re4Gm/lJED6aZkw= X-Sonic-ID: C;anAGKjfy5xGXhCeh2dYaJA== M;xAySKjfy5xGXhCeh2dYaJA== X-Spam-Flag: No X-Sonic-Spam-Details: 0.0/5.0 by cerberusd X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 05 Jan 2018 16:47:47 +0000 X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.25 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 05 Jan 2018 16:40:53 -0000 On 01/05/18 06:55, C Bergström wrote: > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 8:42 PM, Eric McCorkle wrote: > >> On 01/05/2018 05:07, Jules Gilbert wrote: >>> Sorry guys, you just convinced me that no one, not the NSA, not the FSB, >>> no one!, has in the past, or will in the future be able to exploit this >>> to actually do something not nice. >> Attacks have already been demonstrated, pulling secrets out of kernel >> space with meltdown and http headers/passwords out of a browser with >> spectre. Javascript PoCs are already in existence, and we can expect >> them to find their way into adware-based malware within a week or two. >> >> Also, I'd be willing to bet you a year's rent that certain three-letter >> organizations have known about and used this for some time. >> >>> So what is this, really?, it's a market exploit opportunity for AMD. >> Don't bet on it. There's reports of AMD vulnerabilities, also for ARM. >> I doubt any major architecture is going to make it out unscathed. (But >> if one does, my money's on Power) >> > Nope, the only arch that I'm aware of that gets past this is SPARC(hah!) > due to the seperate userland and kernel memory virtualization. > _______________________________________________ POWER has the same thing. It's actually stronger separation, since user processes don't share addresses either -- all processes, including the kernel, have windowed access to an 80-bit address space, so no process can even describe an address in another process's address space. There are ways, of course, in which IBM could have messed up the implementation, so the fact that it *should* be secure does not mean it *is*. SPARC avoids the issue because almost all implementations are in-order. -Nathan