From owner-freebsd-questions@freebsd.org Mon Feb 24 16:56:33 2020 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-questions@mailman.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 843A023AE1E for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:56:33 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from kurt.buff@gmail.com) Received: from mail-oi1-x22a.google.com (mail-oi1-x22a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::22a]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "GTS CA 1O1" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48R7WN5GcVz4bpb for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:56:32 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from kurt.buff@gmail.com) Received: by mail-oi1-x22a.google.com with SMTP id l136so9585651oig.1 for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 08:56:32 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=+U32qfqtW9RAujvodqRIIZmMbJWzpHTw8bdA82LAkOs=; b=vDd98ot/dx6mrUW9PiES/J/Sv4f3VCQIpI2owPUXrTLHpIxuH/4KGUe1A+wB+8m1QH H39QuPFNysmC1AJukAzcRRhOKAxopVoQBjLSSFO1abcTUM4u2/dcT6plAW4CEB8Fq00a +F71kCDy8MRx4DrP8XtLehdFI0xscvcm4t2yAv/z+nH8vyeMgS5IUXBECnnJALjDsDFC 9otikAG3fk/4Ximd4D8HuTORkGcWEvHWZe+dXbMxwxB46F95W/YADWKTl7PSH9XPH1WY xNyHGcKf19eNqZ5BfhC2yBB4+I+eO6u/X0I1wKZFDsdHWeVL3Zs3TaHDiwekygpqxmyU DqJQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=+U32qfqtW9RAujvodqRIIZmMbJWzpHTw8bdA82LAkOs=; b=JcTT6FtkByPu0y4qaY4/J0fZ5SLLShrPV2iYEFuMT0teUX5md+GDq5MZ+VV2wzM+AA NZuxiWO783JKx3BZYmoselpgQebk9/OVPL1oDWOM3O9Jc2aFw4PAS0jKjqrV5d/gbR08 UPML7ClaO+NbNehB/RtKJWEbrKPU/G1QXGGcyNT+0IODKX6d4Oceh49FoeyKD/bHsq4j 9fS6TtOmzzEEDX+ujPVpAJsRKwic23DBkX0OXvsKaYvOnhyEebKklPGMlkJb/5WsyaOt QKsAONjcDdnT49PUAPvNWLg6VX+ccEJof4okkcIEyBNRwC7xVIFe02Z6i2+ERtNN5Ac+ TuXw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVA53HiZ0bIOE7cp6iy3qZHFQyBsVLWlqrpnDslwjEfkIg8Bx+V TKu0g/2psuLHgF9tGY1s2BOX8GxtWIQBF70uyvhIgLy3StuMJA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyQ63D2rI4DAmyuUJZvsvxixjmBD+DEDhdxBNZBrGe1QoN93SMIdS2A5ABtIuFg3imBHo2b2L5T3wPEraj5vv0= X-Received: by 2002:aca:ed08:: with SMTP id l8mr10220oih.80.1582563391077; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 08:56:31 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200223184908.b35d656a.freebsd@edvax.de> <20200224145317.GA9130@neutralgood.org> <20200224151337.30d8d819e7cf74bde984b77a@sohara.org> <20200224110621.3267115d@scorpio> In-Reply-To: <20200224110621.3267115d@scorpio> From: "Kurt Buff - GSEC, GCIH" Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 09:56:19 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: rm | Cleaning up recycle bin To: "freebsd-questions@freebsd.org" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 48R7WN5GcVz4bpb X-Spamd-Bar: ----- Authentication-Results: mx1.freebsd.org; none X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-6.00 / 15.00]; NEURAL_HAM_MEDIUM(-1.00)[-1.000,0]; REPLY(-4.00)[]; TAGGED_FROM(0.00)[]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-1.000,0] X-BeenThere: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: User questions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:56:33 -0000 On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 9:07 AM Jerry wrote: > > On Mon, 24 Feb 2020 09:38:46 -0600, Valeri Galtsev stated: > >It depends on what kind of attack you are trying to defend from. If it > >is theft of your hard drive from your cold powered off machine, then > >this will help (not 100% solve it, just brute force drive decryption > >attack is too expensive or slow). If, however, it is physical machine > >security that you are trying to solve, encrypting drive not > >necessarily will help. The following is the speculation about how the > >attack can be performed. Bad guy has physical access to your machine > >when it is up and running. He opens the case, splashes liquid nitrogen > >onto your RAM, pulls RAM modules, plugs them into his device. Low > >temperature ensures the content of RAM is not lost while physically > >swapping it over to bad guy's device, and that device ensures the > >content of RAM is not lost (pretty much the same way as dynamic RAM is > >used always). And the guy takes the hard drive. Encryption/decryption > >happens on the fly on running machine (otherwise yanking the power > >will allow on to have decrypted drive), and therefore the > >encryption/decryption key(s) must me somewhere in the RAM when machine > >runs. And the bad guy has it all now: the whole content of the RAM > >(with the keys), and [encrypted] hard drive. He has your information. > > Can you document an actual event when this scenario occurred? > > -- > Jerry Citations here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack Kurt