From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Tue Jun 24 19:33:53 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2468669B; Tue, 24 Jun 2014 19:33:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206c::16:87]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0529D2066; Tue, 24 Jun 2014 19:33:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.14.8/8.14.8) with ESMTP id s5OJXqPF035136; Tue, 24 Jun 2014 19:33:52 GMT (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: (from delphij@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.14.9/8.14.9/Submit) id s5OJXqo5035134; Tue, 24 Jun 2014 19:33:52 GMT (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 19:33:52 GMT Message-Id: <201406241933.s5OJXqo5035134@freefall.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: freefall.freebsd.org: delphij set sender to security-advisories@freebsd.org using -f From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:15.iconv Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 19:33:53 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-14:15.iconv Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: iconv(3) NULL pointer dereference and out-of-bounds array access Category: core Module: libc/iconv Announced: 2014-06-24 Credits: Manuel Mausz, Tijl Coosemans Affects: FreeBSD 10.0 Corrected: 2014-03-04 12:43:10 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE) 2014-06-24 19:05:08 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p6) CVE Name: CVE-2014-3951 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background The iconv(3) API allows converting text data from one character set encoding to another. Applications first open a converter between two encodings using iconv_open(3) and then convert text using iconv(3). HZ is an encoding of the GB2312 character set used for simplified Chinese characters. VIQR is an encoding for Vietnamese characters. II. Problem Description A NULL pointer dereference in the initialization code of the HZ module and an out of bounds array access in the initialization code of the VIQR module make iconv_open(3) calls involving HZ or VIQR result in an application crash. III. Impact Services where an attacker can control the arguments of an iconv_open(3) call can be caused to crash resulting in a denial-of-service. For example, an email encoded in HZ may cause an email delivery service to crash if it converts emails to a more generic encoding like UTF-8 before applying filtering rules. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems that do not process untrusted Chinese or Vietnamese input are not affected by this vulnerability. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 10.0] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:15/iconv.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:15/iconv.patch.asc # gpg --verify iconv.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/10/ r262731 releng/10.0/ r267829 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTqc+KAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnmqsP/1VXkGjjBB34Qh43HGxmVofB 8Zfkc19nQtHvQaS+wAUfm10Onu2QJUPPm5OZL+kYYxJs1G4/VLTDTl/7cHBkCoA0 abdDpRbtG6CMHfnaARpMOAkg+uvHl41pjHgr+mi4TRYivzSNp+qfw8BsPJ21DAS6 Om6H6m+ggHjTXrtniBtQ+os2wfxbGGMJQzL94QC+tyzzFTEknIt8lgn6hboh99eV pQb8WnSRCPuyiw+hKHdOOS7er7ZCIy9l0VWWfyJzcZP3/W5q6qSNCdnMUNZsTk0L ruiUrhRjookK6/3VKb+9/YMfpB8xuQad2fk2mbQZkaxdSVJyFIfOI6Y9PJYbx9BP Z7Bp0qyEGs+5/CZhiSwr2E/3k7kNe+30dvbPE0SBw9JNS4T0FyzlRUM4Y8s843Lf GUcacSLcgCv8DUU517GmTL+UvnE+dajppr/vueRTC2T0mj8OX1qukq1Rjs9RpZkc l2ajo3TbMZjwwivEsJEI2706tqv2v7+xON6WrZbUvbXlp4Kw7v01pS2Z3DFIeK8d D9H80XuBIM6ZvMUd3NZHBGBjcxYEHvB5hM26ceCAP/ZvOSa4jp8vVQcPVONwj55n RvX+K66t3yGiRznjhUUL+/8T9ulcI8TomgKL+U3UXasinYU9F4v55yXRugYvgnig jh8e1kgmRt2rt5ZLthe5 =Wr8S -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----