Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 09:25:18 +0000 (UTC) From: =?UTF-8?Q?Roger_Pau_Monn=c3=a9?= <royger@FreeBSD.org> To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-branches@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r459916 - in branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel: . files Message-ID: <201801250925.w0P9PINd032587@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: royger (src committer) Date: Thu Jan 25 09:25:18 2018 New Revision: 459916 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/459916 Log: MFH: r459786 r459787 r459822 xen-kernel: fix build with clang 6 and apply pending XSA patches This includes a band-aid for running 64bit PV guests without compromising the whole system. Approved by: ports-secteam (swills) Added: branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-compat-fix-compilation-errors-with-clang-6.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-compat-fix-compilation-errors-with-clang-6.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch - copied unchanged from r459822, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch - copied unchanged from r459822, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0002-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0002-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa246-4.7.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa246-4.7.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa248-4.8.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa248-4.8.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa249.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa249.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa250.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa250.patch branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa251-4.8.patch - copied unchanged from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa251-4.8.patch Modified: branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile Directory Properties: branches/2018Q1/ (props changed) Modified: branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile ============================================================================== --- branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile Thu Jan 25 09:12:21 2018 (r459915) +++ branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile Thu Jan 25 09:25:18 2018 (r459916) @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ PORTNAME= xen PORTVERSION= 4.7.2 -PORTREVISION= 7 +PORTREVISION= 9 CATEGORIES= emulators MASTER_SITES= http://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${PORTVERSION}/ PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel @@ -81,7 +81,19 @@ EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/0001-xen-logdirty-prevent-p ${FILESDIR}/xsa242-4.9.patch:-p1 \ ${FILESDIR}/xsa243-4.7.patch:-p1 \ ${FILESDIR}/xsa244-4.7.patch:-p1 \ - ${FILESDIR}/xsa236-4.9.patch:-p1 + ${FILESDIR}/xsa236-4.9.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/0001-x86-compat-fix-compilation-errors-with-clang-6.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/xsa246-4.7.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/xsa248-4.8.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/xsa249.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/xsa250.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/xsa251-4.8.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/0001-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/0001-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/0002-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch:-p1 .include <bsd.port.options.mk> Copied: branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch (from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch Thu Jan 25 09:25:18 2018 (r459916, copy of r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch) @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +From f345ca185e0c042ed12bf929a9e93efaf33397bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> +Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2017 16:53:54 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] p2m: Always check to see if removing a p2m entry actually + worked + +The PoD zero-check functions speculatively remove memory from the p2m, +then check to see if it's completely zeroed, before putting it in the +cache. + +Unfortunately, the p2m_set_entry() calls may fail if the underlying +pagetable structure needs to change and the domain has exhausted its +p2m memory pool: for instance, if we're removing a 2MiB region out of +a 1GiB entry (in the p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() case), or a 4k +region out of a 2MiB or larger entry (in the p2m_pod_zero_check() +case); and the return value is not checked. + +The underlying mfn will then be added into the PoD cache, and at some +point mapped into another location in the p2m. If the guest +afterwards ballons out this memory, it will be freed to the hypervisor +and potentially reused by another domain, in spite of the fact that +the original domain still has writable mappings to it. + +There are several places where p2m_set_entry() shouldn't be able to +fail, as it is guaranteed to write an entry of the same order that +succeeded before. Add a backstop of crashing the domain just in case, +and an ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() to flag up the broken assumption on debug +builds. + +While we're here, use PAGE_ORDER_2M rather than a magic constant. + +This is part of XSA-247. + +Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap.com> +Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +--- +v4: +- Removed some training whitespace +v3: +- Reformat reset clause to be more compact +- Make sure to set map[i] = NULL when unmapping in case we need to bail +v2: +- Crash a domain if a p2m_set_entry we think cannot fail fails anyway. +--- + xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c +index 87082cf65f..5ec8a37949 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c +@@ -754,8 +754,10 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn) + } + + /* Try to remove the page, restoring old mapping if it fails. */ +- p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_2M, +- p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access); ++ if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_2M, ++ p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access) ) ++ goto out; ++ + p2m_tlb_flush_sync(p2m); + + /* Make none of the MFNs are used elsewhere... for example, mapped +@@ -812,9 +814,18 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn) + ret = SUPERPAGE_PAGES; + + out_reset: +- if ( reset ) +- p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn0, 9, type0, p2m->default_access); +- ++ /* ++ * This p2m_set_entry() call shouldn't be able to fail, since the same order ++ * on the same gfn succeeded above. If that turns out to be false, crashing ++ * the domain should be the safest way of making sure we don't leak memory. ++ */ ++ if ( reset && p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn0, PAGE_ORDER_2M, ++ type0, p2m->default_access) ) ++ { ++ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); ++ domain_crash(d); ++ } ++ + out: + gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, SUPERPAGE_ORDER); + return ret; +@@ -871,19 +882,30 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long *gfns, int count) + } + + /* Try to remove the page, restoring old mapping if it fails. */ +- p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_4K, +- p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access); ++ if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_4K, ++ p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access) ) ++ goto skip; + + /* See if the page was successfully unmapped. (Allow one refcount + * for being allocated to a domain.) */ + if ( (mfn_to_page(mfns[i])->count_info & PGC_count_mask) > 1 ) + { ++ /* ++ * If the previous p2m_set_entry call succeeded, this one shouldn't ++ * be able to fail. If it does, crashing the domain should be safe. ++ */ ++ if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K, ++ types[i], p2m->default_access) ) ++ { ++ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); ++ domain_crash(d); ++ goto out_unmap; ++ } ++ ++ skip: + unmap_domain_page(map[i]); + map[i] = NULL; + +- p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K, +- types[i], p2m->default_access); +- + continue; + } + } +@@ -902,12 +924,25 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long *gfns, int count) + + unmap_domain_page(map[i]); + +- /* See comment in p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() re gnttab +- * check timing. */ +- if ( j < PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(*map[i]) ) ++ map[i] = NULL; ++ ++ /* ++ * See comment in p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() re gnttab ++ * check timing. ++ */ ++ if ( j < (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*map[i])) ) + { +- p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K, +- types[i], p2m->default_access); ++ /* ++ * If the previous p2m_set_entry call succeeded, this one shouldn't ++ * be able to fail. If it does, crashing the domain should be safe. ++ */ ++ if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K, ++ types[i], p2m->default_access) ) ++ { ++ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); ++ domain_crash(d); ++ goto out_unmap; ++ } + } + else + { +@@ -931,7 +966,17 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long *gfns, int count) + p2m->pod.entry_count++; + } + } +- ++ ++ return; ++ ++out_unmap: ++ /* ++ * Something went wrong, probably crashing the domain. Unmap ++ * everything and return. ++ */ ++ for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ ) ++ if ( map[i] ) ++ unmap_domain_page(map[i]); + } + + #define POD_SWEEP_LIMIT 1024 +-- +2.15.0 + Copied: branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch (from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch Thu Jan 25 09:25:18 2018 (r459916, copy of r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch) @@ -0,0 +1,756 @@ +From e19517a3355acaaa2ff83018bc41e7fd044161e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 17:24:12 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86: Meltdown band-aid against malicious 64-bit PV guests + +This is a very simplistic change limiting the amount of memory a running +64-bit PV guest has mapped (and hence available for attacking): Only the +mappings of stack, IDT, and TSS are being cloned from the direct map +into per-CPU page tables. Guest controlled parts of the page tables are +being copied into those per-CPU page tables upon entry into the guest. +Cross-vCPU synchronization of top level page table entry changes is +being effected by forcing other active vCPU-s of the guest into the +hypervisor. + +The change to context_switch() isn't strictly necessary, but there's no +reason to keep switching page tables once a PV guest is being scheduled +out. + +This isn't providing full isolation yet, but it should be covering all +pieces of information exposure of which would otherwise require an XSA. + +There is certainly much room for improvement, especially of performance, +here - first and foremost suppressing all the negative effects on AMD +systems. But in the interest of backportability (including to really old +hypervisors, which may not even have alternative patching) any such is +being left out here. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +master commit: 5784de3e2067ed73efc2fe42e62831e8ae7f46c4 +master date: 2018-01-16 17:49:03 +0100 +--- + xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 5 + + xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 17 ++++ + xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c | 2 + + xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 11 +++ + xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h | 30 ++++++ + xen/include/asm-x86/current.h | 12 +++ + xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h | 1 + + xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h | 5 +- + 10 files changed, 424 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +index 6539b75fa7..3cf18f95b7 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +@@ -1949,6 +1949,9 @@ static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v) + + switch_kernel_stack(v); + ++ this_cpu(root_pgt)[root_table_offset(PERDOMAIN_VIRT_START)] = ++ l4e_from_page(v->domain->arch.perdomain_l3_pg, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW); ++ + cr4 = pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4(v); + if ( unlikely(cr4 != read_cr4()) ) + write_cr4(cr4); +@@ -2096,6 +2099,8 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next) + + ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled()); + ++ get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0; ++ + cpumask_copy(&dirty_mask, next->vcpu_dirty_cpumask); + /* Allow at most one CPU at a time to be dirty. */ + ASSERT(cpumask_weight(&dirty_mask) <= 1); +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +index 50f500c940..c9e4003989 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -3857,6 +3857,7 @@ long do_mmu_update( + struct vcpu *curr = current, *v = curr; + struct domain *d = v->domain, *pt_owner = d, *pg_owner; + struct domain_mmap_cache mapcache; ++ bool_t sync_guest = 0; + uint32_t xsm_needed = 0; + uint32_t xsm_checked = 0; + int rc = put_old_guest_table(curr); +@@ -4005,6 +4006,8 @@ long do_mmu_update( + case PGT_l4_page_table: + rc = mod_l4_entry(va, l4e_from_intpte(req.val), mfn, + cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v); ++ if ( !rc ) ++ sync_guest = 1; + break; + case PGT_writable_page: + perfc_incr(writable_mmu_updates); +@@ -4107,6 +4110,20 @@ long do_mmu_update( + + domain_mmap_cache_destroy(&mapcache); + ++ if ( sync_guest ) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Force other vCPU-s of the affected guest to pick up L4 entry ++ * changes (if any). Issue a flush IPI with empty operation mask to ++ * facilitate this (including ourselves waiting for the IPI to ++ * actually have arrived). Utilize the fact that FLUSH_VA_VALID is ++ * meaningless without FLUSH_CACHE, but will allow to pass the no-op ++ * check in flush_area_mask(). ++ */ ++ flush_area_mask(pt_owner->domain_dirty_cpumask, ++ ZERO_BLOCK_PTR, FLUSH_VA_VALID); ++ } ++ + perfc_add(num_page_updates, i); + + out: +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +index f9e4ee85ff..eaeec5acf0 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +@@ -319,6 +319,9 @@ void start_secondary(void *unused) + */ + spin_debug_disable(); + ++ get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0; ++ get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt)); ++ + load_system_tables(); + + /* Full exception support from here on in. */ +@@ -628,6 +631,187 @@ void cpu_exit_clear(unsigned int cpu) + set_cpu_state(CPU_STATE_DEAD); + } + ++static int clone_mapping(const void *ptr, root_pgentry_t *rpt) ++{ ++ unsigned long linear = (unsigned long)ptr, pfn; ++ unsigned int flags; ++ l3_pgentry_t *pl3e = l4e_to_l3e(idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(linear)]) + ++ l3_table_offset(linear); ++ l2_pgentry_t *pl2e; ++ l1_pgentry_t *pl1e; ++ ++ if ( linear < DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START ) ++ return 0; ++ ++ flags = l3e_get_flags(*pl3e); ++ ASSERT(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT); ++ if ( flags & _PAGE_PSE ) ++ { ++ pfn = (l3e_get_pfn(*pl3e) & ~((1UL << (2 * PAGETABLE_ORDER)) - 1)) | ++ (PFN_DOWN(linear) & ((1UL << (2 * PAGETABLE_ORDER)) - 1)); ++ flags &= ~_PAGE_PSE; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ pl2e = l3e_to_l2e(*pl3e) + l2_table_offset(linear); ++ flags = l2e_get_flags(*pl2e); ++ ASSERT(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT); ++ if ( flags & _PAGE_PSE ) ++ { ++ pfn = (l2e_get_pfn(*pl2e) & ~((1UL << PAGETABLE_ORDER) - 1)) | ++ (PFN_DOWN(linear) & ((1UL << PAGETABLE_ORDER) - 1)); ++ flags &= ~_PAGE_PSE; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ pl1e = l2e_to_l1e(*pl2e) + l1_table_offset(linear); ++ flags = l1e_get_flags(*pl1e); ++ if ( !(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) ++ return 0; ++ pfn = l1e_get_pfn(*pl1e); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if ( !(root_get_flags(rpt[root_table_offset(linear)]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) ++ { ++ pl3e = alloc_xen_pagetable(); ++ if ( !pl3e ) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ clear_page(pl3e); ++ l4e_write(&rpt[root_table_offset(linear)], ++ l4e_from_paddr(__pa(pl3e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR)); ++ } ++ else ++ pl3e = l4e_to_l3e(rpt[root_table_offset(linear)]); ++ ++ pl3e += l3_table_offset(linear); ++ ++ if ( !(l3e_get_flags(*pl3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) ++ { ++ pl2e = alloc_xen_pagetable(); ++ if ( !pl2e ) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ clear_page(pl2e); ++ l3e_write(pl3e, l3e_from_paddr(__pa(pl2e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR)); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ ASSERT(!(l3e_get_flags(*pl3e) & _PAGE_PSE)); ++ pl2e = l3e_to_l2e(*pl3e); ++ } ++ ++ pl2e += l2_table_offset(linear); ++ ++ if ( !(l2e_get_flags(*pl2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) ++ { ++ pl1e = alloc_xen_pagetable(); ++ if ( !pl1e ) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ clear_page(pl1e); ++ l2e_write(pl2e, l2e_from_paddr(__pa(pl1e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR)); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ ASSERT(!(l2e_get_flags(*pl2e) & _PAGE_PSE)); ++ pl1e = l2e_to_l1e(*pl2e); ++ } ++ ++ pl1e += l1_table_offset(linear); ++ ++ if ( l1e_get_flags(*pl1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT ) ++ { ++ ASSERT(l1e_get_pfn(*pl1e) == pfn); ++ ASSERT(l1e_get_flags(*pl1e) == flags); ++ } ++ else ++ l1e_write(pl1e, l1e_from_pfn(pfn, flags)); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++DEFINE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt); ++ ++static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu) ++{ ++ root_pgentry_t *rpt = alloc_xen_pagetable(); ++ unsigned int off; ++ int rc; ++ ++ if ( !rpt ) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ clear_page(rpt); ++ per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu) = rpt; ++ ++ rpt[root_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)] = ++ idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)]; ++ /* SH_LINEAR_PT inserted together with guest mappings. */ ++ /* PERDOMAIN inserted during context switch. */ ++ rpt[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)] = ++ idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)]; ++ ++ /* Install direct map page table entries for stack, IDT, and TSS. */ ++ for ( off = rc = 0; !rc && off < STACK_SIZE; off += PAGE_SIZE ) ++ rc = clone_mapping(__va(__pa(stack_base[cpu])) + off, rpt); ++ ++ if ( !rc ) ++ rc = clone_mapping(idt_tables[cpu], rpt); ++ if ( !rc ) ++ rc = clone_mapping(&per_cpu(init_tss, cpu), rpt); ++ ++ return rc; ++} ++ ++static void cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu) ++{ ++ root_pgentry_t *rpt = per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu); ++ unsigned int r; ++ ++ if ( !rpt ) ++ return; ++ ++ per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu) = NULL; ++ ++ for ( r = root_table_offset(DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START); ++ r < root_table_offset(HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END); ++r ) ++ { ++ l3_pgentry_t *l3t; ++ unsigned int i3; ++ ++ if ( !(root_get_flags(rpt[r]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) ++ continue; ++ ++ l3t = l4e_to_l3e(rpt[r]); ++ ++ for ( i3 = 0; i3 < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i3 ) ++ { ++ l2_pgentry_t *l2t; ++ unsigned int i2; ++ ++ if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3t[i3]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) ++ continue; ++ ++ ASSERT(!(l3e_get_flags(l3t[i3]) & _PAGE_PSE)); ++ l2t = l3e_to_l2e(l3t[i3]); ++ ++ for ( i2 = 0; i2 < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i2 ) ++ { ++ if ( !(l2e_get_flags(l2t[i2]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) ++ continue; ++ ++ ASSERT(!(l2e_get_flags(l2t[i2]) & _PAGE_PSE)); ++ free_xen_pagetable(l2e_to_l1e(l2t[i2])); ++ } ++ ++ free_xen_pagetable(l2t); ++ } ++ ++ free_xen_pagetable(l3t); ++ } ++ ++ free_xen_pagetable(rpt); ++} ++ + static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu) + { + unsigned int order, socket = cpu_to_socket(cpu); +@@ -664,6 +848,8 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu) + free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(mfn)); + } + ++ cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu); ++ + order = get_order_from_pages(NR_RESERVED_GDT_PAGES); + free_xenheap_pages(per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu), order); + +@@ -719,6 +905,9 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu) + set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi], IST_NONE); + set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE); + ++ if ( setup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu) ) ++ goto oom; ++ + for ( stub_page = 0, i = cpu & ~(STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1); + i < nr_cpu_ids && i <= (cpu | (STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1)); ++i ) + if ( cpu_online(i) && cpu_to_node(i) == node ) +@@ -773,6 +962,8 @@ static struct notifier_block cpu_smpboot_nfb = { + + void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus) + { ++ int rc; ++ + register_cpu_notifier(&cpu_smpboot_nfb); + + mtrr_aps_sync_begin(); +@@ -786,6 +977,11 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus) + + stack_base[0] = stack_start; + ++ rc = setup_cpu_root_pgt(0); ++ if ( rc ) ++ panic("Error %d setting up PV root page table\n", rc); ++ get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(per_cpu(root_pgt, 0)); ++ + set_nr_sockets(); + + socket_cpumask = xzalloc_array(cpumask_t *, nr_sockets); +@@ -850,6 +1046,8 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void) + { + cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &cpu_online_map); + cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &cpu_present_map); ++ ++ get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0; + } + + static void +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c +index a3ae7a475f..4f2ba28520 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c +@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ void __dummy__(void) + OFFSET(CPUINFO_processor_id, struct cpu_info, processor_id); + OFFSET(CPUINFO_current_vcpu, struct cpu_info, current_vcpu); + OFFSET(CPUINFO_cr4, struct cpu_info, cr4); ++ OFFSET(CPUINFO_xen_cr3, struct cpu_info, xen_cr3); ++ OFFSET(CPUINFO_pv_cr3, struct cpu_info, pv_cr3); + DEFINE(CPUINFO_sizeof, sizeof(struct cpu_info)); + BLANK(); + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S +index 7ee01597a3..f7e53fb3cb 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S +@@ -270,6 +270,17 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter) + pushq $0 + movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL ++ ++ GET_STACK_END(bx) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx ++ neg %rcx ++ jz .Lcstar_cr3_okay ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx) ++ neg %rcx ++ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi ++ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx) ++.Lcstar_cr3_okay: ++ + GET_CURRENT(bx) + movq VCPU_domain(%rbx),%rcx + cmpb $0,DOMAIN_is_32bit_pv(%rcx) +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +index cebb1e4f4f..d63e734bb3 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +@@ -36,6 +36,32 @@ ENTRY(switch_to_kernel) + /* %rbx: struct vcpu, interrupts disabled */ + restore_all_guest: + ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED ++ ++ /* Copy guest mappings and switch to per-CPU root page table. */ ++ mov %cr3, %r9 ++ GET_STACK_END(dx) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(pv_cr3)(%rdx), %rdi ++ movabs $PADDR_MASK & PAGE_MASK, %rsi ++ movabs $DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START, %rcx ++ mov %rdi, %rax ++ and %rsi, %rdi ++ and %r9, %rsi ++ add %rcx, %rdi ++ add %rcx, %rsi ++ mov $ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT, %ecx ++ mov root_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)*8(%rsi), %r8 ++ mov %r8, root_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)*8(%rdi) ++ rep movsq ++ mov $ROOT_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - \ ++ ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1, %ecx ++ sub $(ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT - \ ++ ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1) * 8, %rsi ++ sub $(ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT - \ ++ ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1) * 8, %rdi ++ rep movsq ++ mov %r9, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rdx) ++ write_cr3 rax, rdi, rsi ++ + RESTORE_ALL + testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp) + jz iret_exit_to_guest +@@ -70,6 +96,22 @@ iret_exit_to_guest: + ALIGN + /* No special register assumptions. */ + restore_all_xen: ++ /* ++ * Check whether we need to switch to the per-CPU page tables, in ++ * case we return to late PV exit code (from an NMI or #MC). ++ */ ++ GET_STACK_END(ax) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rax), %rdx ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(pv_cr3)(%rax), %rax ++ test %rdx, %rdx ++ /* ++ * Ideally the condition would be "nsz", but such doesn't exist, ++ * so "g" will have to do. ++ */ ++UNLIKELY_START(g, exit_cr3) ++ write_cr3 rax, rdi, rsi ++UNLIKELY_END(exit_cr3) ++ + RESTORE_ALL adj=8 + iretq + +@@ -99,7 +141,18 @@ ENTRY(lstar_enter) + pushq $0 + movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL +- GET_CURRENT(bx) ++ ++ GET_STACK_END(bx) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx ++ neg %rcx ++ jz .Llstar_cr3_okay ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx) ++ neg %rcx ++ write_cr3 rcx, r11, r12 ++ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx) ++.Llstar_cr3_okay: ++ ++ __GET_CURRENT(bx) + testb $TF_kernel_mode,VCPU_thread_flags(%rbx) + jz switch_to_kernel + +@@ -248,7 +301,18 @@ GLOBAL(sysenter_eflags_saved) + pushq $0 + movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL +- GET_CURRENT(bx) ++ ++ GET_STACK_END(bx) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx ++ neg %rcx ++ jz .Lsyse_cr3_okay ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx) ++ neg %rcx ++ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi ++ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx) ++.Lsyse_cr3_okay: ++ ++ __GET_CURRENT(bx) + cmpb $0,VCPU_sysenter_disables_events(%rbx) + movq VCPU_sysenter_addr(%rbx),%rax + setne %cl +@@ -284,13 +348,23 @@ ENTRY(int80_direct_trap) + movl $0x80, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL + ++ GET_STACK_END(bx) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx ++ neg %rcx ++ jz .Lint80_cr3_okay ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx) ++ neg %rcx ++ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi ++ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx) ++.Lint80_cr3_okay: ++ + cmpb $0,untrusted_msi(%rip) + UNLIKELY_START(ne, msi_check) + movl $0x80,%edi + call check_for_unexpected_msi + UNLIKELY_END(msi_check) + +- GET_CURRENT(bx) ++ __GET_CURRENT(bx) + + /* Check that the callback is non-null. */ + leaq VCPU_int80_bounce(%rbx),%rdx +@@ -441,9 +515,27 @@ ENTRY(dom_crash_sync_extable) + + ENTRY(common_interrupt) + SAVE_ALL CLAC ++ ++ GET_STACK_END(14) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx ++ mov %rcx, %r15 ++ neg %rcx ++ jz .Lintr_cr3_okay ++ jns .Lintr_cr3_load ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) ++ neg %rcx ++.Lintr_cr3_load: ++ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi ++ xor %ecx, %ecx ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) ++ testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp) ++ cmovnz %rcx, %r15 ++.Lintr_cr3_okay: ++ + CR4_PV32_RESTORE + movq %rsp,%rdi + callq do_IRQ ++ mov %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) + jmp ret_from_intr + + /* No special register assumptions. */ +@@ -461,6 +553,23 @@ ENTRY(page_fault) + /* No special register assumptions. */ + GLOBAL(handle_exception) + SAVE_ALL CLAC ++ ++ GET_STACK_END(14) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx ++ mov %rcx, %r15 ++ neg %rcx ++ jz .Lxcpt_cr3_okay ++ jns .Lxcpt_cr3_load ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) ++ neg %rcx ++.Lxcpt_cr3_load: ++ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi ++ xor %ecx, %ecx ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) ++ testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp) ++ cmovnz %rcx, %r15 ++.Lxcpt_cr3_okay: ++ + handle_exception_saved: + GET_CURRENT(bx) + testb $X86_EFLAGS_IF>>8,UREGS_eflags+1(%rsp) +@@ -525,6 +634,7 @@ handle_exception_saved: + leaq exception_table(%rip),%rdx + PERFC_INCR(exceptions, %rax, %rbx) + callq *(%rdx,%rax,8) ++ mov %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) + testb $3,UREGS_cs(%rsp) + jz restore_all_xen + leaq VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx),%rdx +@@ -557,6 +667,7 @@ exception_with_ints_disabled: + rep; movsq # make room for ec/ev + 1: movq UREGS_error_code(%rsp),%rax # ec/ev + movq %rax,UREGS_kernel_sizeof(%rsp) ++ mov %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) + jmp restore_all_xen # return to fixup code + + /* No special register assumptions. */ +@@ -634,6 +745,17 @@ ENTRY(double_fault) + movl $TRAP_double_fault,4(%rsp) + /* Set AC to reduce chance of further SMAP faults */ + SAVE_ALL STAC ++ ++ GET_STACK_END(bx) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rbx ++ test %rbx, %rbx ++ jz .Ldblf_cr3_okay ++ jns .Ldblf_cr3_load ++ neg %rbx ++.Ldblf_cr3_load: ++ write_cr3 rbx, rdi, rsi ++.Ldblf_cr3_okay: ++ + movq %rsp,%rdi + call do_double_fault + BUG /* do_double_fault() shouldn't return. */ +@@ -652,10 +774,28 @@ ENTRY(nmi) + movl $TRAP_nmi,4(%rsp) + handle_ist_exception: + SAVE_ALL CLAC ++ ++ GET_STACK_END(14) ++ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx ++ mov %rcx, %r15 ++ neg %rcx ++ jz .List_cr3_okay ++ jns .List_cr3_load ++ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) ++ neg %rcx ++.List_cr3_load: ++ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi ++ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) ++.List_cr3_okay: ++ + CR4_PV32_RESTORE + testb $3,UREGS_cs(%rsp) + jz 1f +- /* Interrupted guest context. Copy the context to stack bottom. */ ++ /* ++ * Interrupted guest context. Clear the restore value for xen_cr3 ++ * and copy the context to stack bottom. ++ */ ++ xor %r15, %r15 + GET_CPUINFO_FIELD(guest_cpu_user_regs,di) + movq %rsp,%rsi + movl $UREGS_kernel_sizeof/8,%ecx +@@ -665,6 +805,7 @@ handle_ist_exception: + movzbl UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp),%eax + leaq exception_table(%rip),%rdx + callq *(%rdx,%rax,8) ++ mov %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14) + cmpb $TRAP_nmi,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp) + jne ret_from_intr + +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h +index 6e5c079ad8..6cfdaa1aa0 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h +@@ -93,9 +93,30 @@ void ret_from_intr(void); + UNLIKELY_DONE(mp, tag); \ + __UNLIKELY_END(tag) + ++ .equ .Lrax, 0 ++ .equ .Lrcx, 1 ++ .equ .Lrdx, 2 ++ .equ .Lrbx, 3 ++ .equ .Lrsp, 4 ++ .equ .Lrbp, 5 ++ .equ .Lrsi, 6 ++ .equ .Lrdi, 7 ++ .equ .Lr8, 8 ++ .equ .Lr9, 9 ++ .equ .Lr10, 10 ++ .equ .Lr11, 11 ++ .equ .Lr12, 12 ++ .equ .Lr13, 13 ++ .equ .Lr14, 14 ++ .equ .Lr15, 15 ++ + #define STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(field) (1 - CPUINFO_sizeof + CPUINFO_##field) + #define GET_STACK_END(reg) \ ++ .if .Lr##reg > 8; \ ++ movq $STACK_SIZE-1, %r##reg; \ ++ .else; \ + movl $STACK_SIZE-1, %e##reg; \ ++ .endif; \ + orq %rsp, %r##reg + + #define GET_CPUINFO_FIELD(field, reg) \ +@@ -177,6 +198,15 @@ void ret_from_intr(void); + #define ASM_STAC ASM_AC(STAC) + #define ASM_CLAC ASM_AC(CLAC) + ++.macro write_cr3 val:req, tmp1:req, tmp2:req ++ mov %cr4, %\tmp1 ++ mov %\tmp1, %\tmp2 ++ and $~X86_CR4_PGE, %\tmp1 ++ mov %\tmp1, %cr4 ++ mov %\val, %cr3 ++ mov %\tmp2, %cr4 ++.endm ++ + #define CR4_PV32_RESTORE \ + 667: ASM_NOP5; \ + .pushsection .altinstr_replacement, "ax"; \ +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h +index e6587e684c..397fa4c38f 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h +@@ -42,6 +42,18 @@ struct cpu_info { + struct vcpu *current_vcpu; + unsigned long per_cpu_offset; + unsigned long cr4; ++ /* ++ * Of the two following fields the latter is being set to the CR3 value ++ * to be used on the given pCPU for loading whenever 64-bit PV guest ++ * context is being entered. The value never changes once set. ++ * The former is the value to restore when re-entering Xen, if any. IOW ++ * its value being zero means there's nothing to restore. However, its ++ * value can also be negative, indicating to the exit-to-Xen code that ++ * restoring is not necessary, but allowing any nested entry code paths ++ * to still know the value to put back into CR3. ++ */ ++ unsigned long xen_cr3; ++ unsigned long pv_cr3; + /* get_stack_bottom() must be 16-byte aligned */ + }; + +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h +index ccd406a3fe..9906f38f2d 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h +@@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ extern idt_entry_t idt_table[]; + extern idt_entry_t *idt_tables[]; + + DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss); ++DECLARE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt); + + extern void init_int80_direct_trap(struct vcpu *v); + +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h +index 589f22552e..afc77c3237 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h +@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ + /* These are architectural limits. Current CPUs support only 40-bit phys. */ + #define PADDR_BITS 52 + #define VADDR_BITS 48 +-#define PADDR_MASK ((1UL << PADDR_BITS)-1) +-#define VADDR_MASK ((1UL << VADDR_BITS)-1) ++#define PADDR_MASK ((_AC(1,UL) << PADDR_BITS) - 1) ++#define VADDR_MASK ((_AC(1,UL) << VADDR_BITS) - 1) + + #define is_canonical_address(x) (((long)(x) >> 47) == ((long)(x) >> 63)) + +@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ typedef l4_pgentry_t root_pgentry_t; + : (((_s) < ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT) || \ + ((_s) > ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT))) + ++#define root_table_offset l4_table_offset + #define root_get_pfn l4e_get_pfn + #define root_get_flags l4e_get_flags + #define root_get_intpte l4e_get_intpte +-- +2.15.1 + Copied: branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-compat-fix-compilation-errors-with-clang-6.patch (from r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-compat-fix-compilation-errors-with-clang-6.patch) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ branches/2018Q1/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-compat-fix-compilation-errors-with-clang-6.patch Thu Jan 25 09:25:18 2018 (r459916, copy of r459786, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-compat-fix-compilation-errors-with-clang-6.patch) @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From 58e028648e3bc831b1b60a39b7f1661538fa6a34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com> +Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 16:05:17 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] x86/compat: fix compilation errors with clang 6 +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +The following errors are generated when compiling Xen with clang 6: + +In file included from x86_64/asm-offsets.c:9: +In file included from /root/src/xen/xen/include/xen/sched.h:8: +In file included from /root/src/xen/xen/include/xen/shared.h:6: +In file included from /root/src/xen/xen/include/compat/arch-x86/../xen.h:9: +/root/src/xen/xen/include/compat/arch-x86/xen.h:10:10: error: the current #pragma pack aligment + value is modified in the included file [-Werror,-Wpragma-pack] +#include "xen-x86_32.h" + ^ +/root/src/xen/xen/include/compat/arch-x86/xen-x86_32.h:40:9: note: previous '#pragma pack' + directive that modifies alignment is here +#pragma pack() + ^ +In file included from x86_64/asm-offsets.c:9: +In file included from /root/src/xen/xen/include/xen/sched.h:8: +In file included from /root/src/xen/xen/include/xen/shared.h:6: +/root/src/xen/xen/include/compat/arch-x86/../xen.h:9:10: error: the current #pragma pack aligment + value is modified in the included file [-Werror,-Wpragma-pack] *** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***
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