From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Aug 11 00:01:03 2003 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9728F37B401 for ; Mon, 11 Aug 2003 00:01:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx1.tekgenesis.net (server1.cluster1.tekgenesis.net [64.235.250.21]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31D3243F3F for ; Mon, 11 Aug 2003 00:01:03 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from wiz@mx1.tekgenesis.net) Received: by mx1.tekgenesis.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 36AA2B8B6; Sun, 10 Aug 2003 21:01:03 -1000 (HST) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2003 21:01:03 -1000 From: Jason Dambrosio To: Bruce M Simpson Message-ID: <20030811070103.GB85000@tekgenesis.net> References: <200308110257.h7B2v6YJ061278@freefall.freebsd.org> <20030811063316.GA85000@tekgenesis.net> <20030811064438.GG31845@spc.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20030811064438.GG31845@spc.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4i cc: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-03:09.signal X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Security issues [members-only posting] List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2003 07:01:03 -0000 On Mon, Aug 11, 2003 at 07:44:38AM +0100, Bruce M Simpson wrote: > On Sun, Aug 10, 2003 at 08:33:16PM -1000, Jason Dambrosio wrote: > > Wouldn't a possible workaround be, to load a kld module that would > > replace the ptrace(2) system call with a patched one? I remember doing > > such a trick for modifying other system calls using kld modules... > > That isn't really a solution; more of a band-aid. That's exactly why I called it a workaround and not a solution. The primary idea of a workaround being to avoid having downtime for a reboot to patch the kernel until your next scheduled maintence window. > Besides, if someone compromises the system in some other way, they can > just remove your module or unload it. Unless you're a big securelevels fan. If someone compromises the system via some other method, why would they care about unloading a module if they already have root? My point was simply that the advisory said there was no workaround, but I believe you could use this method as a workaround. Jason