Date: Thu, 19 May 2016 21:12:08 +0000 (UTC) From: John Marino <marino@FreeBSD.org> To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r415527 - in head/security/wpa_supplicant: . files Message-ID: <201605192112.u4JLC8nv011865@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: marino Date: Thu May 19 21:12:07 2016 New Revision: 415527 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/415527 Log: security/wpa_supplicant: Add security patch set 2016-1 A vulnerability was found in how hostapd and wpa_supplicant writes the configuration file update for the WPA/WPA2 passphrase parameter. If this parameter has been updated to include control characters either through a WPS operation (CVE-2016-4476) or through local configuration change over the wpa_supplicant control interface (CVE-2016-4477), the resulting configuration file may prevent the hostapd and wpa_supplicant from starting when the updated file is used. In addition for wpa_supplicant, it may be possible to load a local library file and execute code from there with the same privileges under which the wpa_supplicant process runs. These patches were developed upstream and published as a response to the security advisories CVE-2016-4476 and CVE-2016-4477. PR: 209564 Requested by: Sevan Janiyan Added: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_1-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase (contents, props changed) head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_2-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha (contents, props changed) head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_3-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o (contents, props changed) head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_4-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in (contents, props changed) head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_5-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s (contents, props changed) Modified: head/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile Modified: head/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile ============================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile Thu May 19 20:55:46 2016 (r415526) +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile Thu May 19 21:12:07 2016 (r415527) @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ PORTNAME= wpa_supplicant PORTVERSION= 2.5 -PORTREVISION= 1 +PORTREVISION= 2 CATEGORIES= security net MASTER_SITES= http://w1.fi/releases/ Added: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_1-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_1-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase Thu May 19 21:12:07 2016 (r415527) @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase + +WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control +characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as +STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or +WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase. + +This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated +the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from +an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should +such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file +could become invalid and fail to be parsed. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + src/utils/common.h | 1 + + src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) + +--- src/utils/common.c ++++ src/utils/common.c +@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len) + } + + ++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { ++ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) +--- src/utils/common.h ++++ src/utils/common.h +@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); + + char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); + int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); ++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); +--- src/wps/wps_attr_process.c ++++ src/wps/wps_attr_process.c +@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred) + cred->key_len--; + #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */ + } ++ ++ ++ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) && ++ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase"); ++ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key", ++ cred->key, cred->key_len); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + return 0; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + Added: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_2-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_2-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha Thu May 19 21:12:07 2016 (r415527) @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase + character + +WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control +characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase +includes an invalid passphrase. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of +almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration +file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., +opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, +load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. +This would allow code from that library to be executed under the +wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data, + } + wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", + (u8 *) value, len); ++ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character", ++ line); ++ return -1; ++ } + if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && + os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { + /* No change to the previously configured value */ +-- +1.9.1 + Added: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_3-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_3-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o Thu May 19 21:12:07 2016 (r415527) @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> +Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network + output + +Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the +wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block +parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have +been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control +characters in the psk parameter. + +Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> +--- + src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ + src/utils/common.h | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- src/utils/common.c ++++ src/utils/common.c +@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) + } + + ++int has_newline(const char *str) ++{ ++ while (*str) { ++ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r') ++ return 1; ++ str++; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) +--- src/utils/common.h ++++ src/utils/common.h +@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); + char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); + int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); + int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); ++int has_newline(const char *str); + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); +--- wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var) + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) { + const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i]; +- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) +- return field->writer(field, ssid); ++ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) { ++ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid); ++ ++ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it", ++ var); ++ os_free(ret); ++ ret = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return ret; ++ } + } + + return NULL; +-- +1.9.1 + Added: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_4-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_4-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in Thu May 19 21:12:07 2016 (r415527) @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without +filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, +unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the credential value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + + if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && + os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { ++ if (has_newline(value)) ++ return -1; + str_clear_free(cred->password); + cred->password = os_strdup(value); + cred->ext_password = 1; +@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + } + + val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); +- if (val == NULL) { ++ if (val == NULL || ++ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ has_newline(val))) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " + "value '%s'.", line, var, value); ++ os_free(val); + return -1; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + Added: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_5-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_5-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s Thu May 19 21:12:07 2016 (r415527) @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings +without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the +value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data, + return -1; + } + ++ if (has_newline(pos)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline", ++ line, data->name); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + tmp = os_strdup(pos); + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; +-- +1.9.1 +
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