From owner-svn-src-head@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Oct 27 11:46:20 2008 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-head@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D4021065685; Mon, 27 Oct 2008 11:46:20 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from rwatson@FreeBSD.org) Received: from svn.freebsd.org (svn.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::2c]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 392FE8FC08; Mon, 27 Oct 2008 11:46:20 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from rwatson@FreeBSD.org) Received: from svn.freebsd.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by svn.freebsd.org (8.14.3/8.14.3) with ESMTP id m9RBkKNI038370; Mon, 27 Oct 2008 11:46:20 GMT (envelope-from rwatson@svn.freebsd.org) Received: (from rwatson@localhost) by svn.freebsd.org (8.14.3/8.14.3/Submit) id m9RBkKZo038368; Mon, 27 Oct 2008 11:46:20 GMT (envelope-from rwatson@svn.freebsd.org) Message-Id: <200810271146.m9RBkKZo038368@svn.freebsd.org> From: Robert Watson Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2008 11:46:20 +0000 (UTC) To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org X-SVN-Group: head MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Cc: Subject: svn commit: r184330 - head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended X-BeenThere: svn-src-head@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the src tree for head/-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2008 11:46:20 -0000 Author: rwatson Date: Mon Oct 27 11:46:19 2008 New Revision: 184330 URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/184330 Log: Copy mac_bsdextended.c to two object-specific files as a prototype for how modularize MAC policy layout. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Added: head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/ugidfw_system.c (props changed) - copied unchanged from r184328, head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/ugidfw_vnode.c (props changed) - copied unchanged from r184328, head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c Copied: head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/ugidfw_system.c (from r184328, head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/ugidfw_system.c Mon Oct 27 11:46:19 2008 (r184330, copy of r184328, head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c) @@ -0,0 +1,768 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2007 Robert N. M. Watson + * Copyright (c) 2001-2005 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. + * Copyright (c) 2005 Tom Rhodes + * Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project. + * It was later enhanced by Tom Rhodes for the TrustedBSD Project. + * + * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network + * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network + * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), + * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. + * + * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract + * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS"). + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $FreeBSD$ + */ + +/* + * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. + * + * "BSD Extended" MAC policy, allowing the administrator to impose mandatory + * firewall-like rules regarding users and file system objects. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +static struct mtx ugidfw_mtx; + +SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac); + +SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, bsdextended, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, + "TrustedBSD extended BSD MAC policy controls"); + +static int ugidfw_enabled = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW, + &ugidfw_enabled, 0, "Enforce extended BSD policy"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.bsdextended.enabled", &ugidfw_enabled); + +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACBSDEXTENDED, "mac_bsdextended", "BSD Extended MAC rule"); + +#define MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES 250 +static struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rules[MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES]; +static int rule_count = 0; +static int rule_slots = 0; +static int rule_version = MB_VERSION; + +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rule_count, CTLFLAG_RD, + &rule_count, 0, "Number of defined rules\n"); +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rule_slots, CTLFLAG_RD, + &rule_slots, 0, "Number of used rule slots\n"); +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rule_version, CTLFLAG_RD, + &rule_version, 0, "Version number for API\n"); + +/* + * This is just used for logging purposes, eventually we would like to log + * much more then failed requests. + */ +static int ugidfw_logging; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, logging, CTLFLAG_RW, + &ugidfw_logging, 0, "Log failed authorization requests"); + +/* + * This tunable is here for compatibility. It will allow the user to switch + * between the new mode (first rule matches) and the old functionality (all + * rules match). + */ +static int ugidfw_firstmatch_enabled; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, firstmatch_enabled, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ugidfw_firstmatch_enabled, 1, + "Disable/enable match first rule functionality"); + +static int +ugidfw_rule_valid(struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rule) +{ + + if ((rule->mbr_subject.mbs_flags | MBS_ALL_FLAGS) != MBS_ALL_FLAGS) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_subject.mbs_neg | MBS_ALL_FLAGS) != MBS_ALL_FLAGS) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags | MBO_ALL_FLAGS) != MBO_ALL_FLAGS) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg | MBO_ALL_FLAGS) != MBO_ALL_FLAGS) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg | MBO_TYPE_DEFINED) && + (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type | MBO_ALL_TYPE) != MBO_ALL_TYPE) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_mode | MBI_ALLPERM) != MBI_ALLPERM) + return (EINVAL); + return (0); +} + +static int +sysctl_rule(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) +{ + struct mac_bsdextended_rule temprule, *ruleptr; + u_int namelen; + int error, index, *name; + + error = 0; + name = (int *)arg1; + namelen = arg2; + if (namelen != 1) + return (EINVAL); + index = name[0]; + if (index >= MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES) + return (ENOENT); + + ruleptr = NULL; + if (req->newptr && req->newlen != 0) { + error = SYSCTL_IN(req, &temprule, sizeof(temprule)); + if (error) + return (error); + ruleptr = malloc(sizeof(*ruleptr), M_MACBSDEXTENDED, + M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + } + + mtx_lock(&ugidfw_mtx); + if (req->oldptr) { + if (index < 0 || index > rule_slots + 1) { + error = ENOENT; + goto out; + } + if (rules[index] == NULL) { + error = ENOENT; + goto out; + } + temprule = *rules[index]; + } + if (req->newptr && req->newlen == 0) { + KASSERT(ruleptr == NULL, ("sysctl_rule: ruleptr != NULL")); + ruleptr = rules[index]; + if (ruleptr == NULL) { + error = ENOENT; + goto out; + } + rule_count--; + rules[index] = NULL; + } else if (req->newptr) { + error = ugidfw_rule_valid(&temprule); + if (error) + goto out; + if (rules[index] == NULL) { + *ruleptr = temprule; + rules[index] = ruleptr; + ruleptr = NULL; + if (index + 1 > rule_slots) + rule_slots = index + 1; + rule_count++; + } else + *rules[index] = temprule; + } +out: + mtx_unlock(&ugidfw_mtx); + if (ruleptr != NULL) + free(ruleptr, M_MACBSDEXTENDED); + if (req->oldptr && error == 0) + error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &temprule, sizeof(temprule)); + return (error); +} + +SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rules, CTLFLAG_RW, + sysctl_rule, "BSD extended MAC rules"); + +static void +ugidfw_init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc) +{ + + mtx_init(&ugidfw_mtx, "mac_bsdextended lock", NULL, MTX_DEF); +} + +static void +ugidfw_destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc) +{ + + mtx_destroy(&ugidfw_mtx); +} + +static int +ugidfw_rulecheck(struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rule, + struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap, int acc_mode) +{ + int mac_granted, match, priv_granted; + int i; + + /* + * Is there a subject match? + */ + mtx_assert(&ugidfw_mtx, MA_OWNED); + if (rule->mbr_subject.mbs_flags & MBS_UID_DEFINED) { + match = ((cred->cr_uid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_uid_max && + cred->cr_uid >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_uid_min) || + (cred->cr_ruid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_uid_max && + cred->cr_ruid >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_uid_min) || + (cred->cr_svuid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_uid_max && + cred->cr_svuid >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_uid_min)); + if (rule->mbr_subject.mbs_neg & MBS_UID_DEFINED) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_subject.mbs_flags & MBS_GID_DEFINED) { + match = ((cred->cr_rgid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_max && + cred->cr_rgid >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_min) || + (cred->cr_svgid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_max && + cred->cr_svgid >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_min)); + if (!match) { + for (i = 0; i < cred->cr_ngroups; i++) { + if (cred->cr_groups[i] + <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_max && + cred->cr_groups[i] + >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_min) { + match = 1; + break; + } + } + } + if (rule->mbr_subject.mbs_neg & MBS_GID_DEFINED) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_subject.mbs_flags & MBS_PRISON_DEFINED) { + match = (cred->cr_prison != NULL && + cred->cr_prison->pr_id == rule->mbr_subject.mbs_prison); + if (rule->mbr_subject.mbs_neg & MBS_PRISON_DEFINED) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + /* + * Is there an object match? + */ + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags & MBO_UID_DEFINED) { + match = (vap->va_uid <= rule->mbr_object.mbo_uid_max && + vap->va_uid >= rule->mbr_object.mbo_uid_min); + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg & MBO_UID_DEFINED) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags & MBO_GID_DEFINED) { + match = (vap->va_gid <= rule->mbr_object.mbo_gid_max && + vap->va_gid >= rule->mbr_object.mbo_gid_min); + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg & MBO_GID_DEFINED) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags & MBO_FSID_DEFINED) { + match = (bcmp(&(vp->v_mount->mnt_stat.f_fsid), + &(rule->mbr_object.mbo_fsid), + sizeof(rule->mbr_object.mbo_fsid)) == 0); + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg & MBO_FSID_DEFINED) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags & MBO_SUID) { + match = (vap->va_mode & S_ISUID); + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg & MBO_SUID) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags & MBO_SGID) { + match = (vap->va_mode & S_ISGID); + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg & MBO_SGID) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags & MBO_UID_SUBJECT) { + match = (vap->va_uid == cred->cr_uid || + vap->va_uid == cred->cr_ruid || + vap->va_uid == cred->cr_svuid); + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg & MBO_UID_SUBJECT) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags & MBO_GID_SUBJECT) { + match = (groupmember(vap->va_gid, cred) || + vap->va_gid == cred->cr_rgid || + vap->va_gid == cred->cr_svgid); + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg & MBO_GID_SUBJECT) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags & MBO_TYPE_DEFINED) { + switch (vap->va_type) { + case VREG: + match = (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type & MBO_TYPE_REG); + break; + case VDIR: + match = (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type & MBO_TYPE_DIR); + break; + case VBLK: + match = (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type & MBO_TYPE_BLK); + break; + case VCHR: + match = (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type & MBO_TYPE_CHR); + break; + case VLNK: + match = (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type & MBO_TYPE_LNK); + break; + case VSOCK: + match = (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type & MBO_TYPE_SOCK); + break; + case VFIFO: + match = (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type & MBO_TYPE_FIFO); + break; + default: + match = 0; + } + if (rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg & MBO_TYPE_DEFINED) + match = !match; + if (!match) + return (0); + } + + /* + * MBI_APPEND should not be here as it should get converted to + * MBI_WRITE. + */ + priv_granted = 0; + mac_granted = rule->mbr_mode; + if ((acc_mode & MBI_ADMIN) && (mac_granted & MBI_ADMIN) == 0 && + priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0) == 0) + priv_granted |= MBI_ADMIN; + if ((acc_mode & MBI_EXEC) && (mac_granted & MBI_EXEC) == 0 && + priv_check_cred(cred, (vap->va_type == VDIR) ? PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP : + PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0) == 0) + priv_granted |= MBI_EXEC; + if ((acc_mode & MBI_READ) && (mac_granted & MBI_READ) == 0 && + priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0) == 0) + priv_granted |= MBI_READ; + if ((acc_mode & MBI_STAT) && (mac_granted & MBI_STAT) == 0 && + priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STAT, 0) == 0) + priv_granted |= MBI_STAT; + if ((acc_mode & MBI_WRITE) && (mac_granted & MBI_WRITE) == 0 && + priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0) == 0) + priv_granted |= MBI_WRITE; + /* + * Is the access permitted? + */ + if (((mac_granted | priv_granted) & acc_mode) != acc_mode) { + if (ugidfw_logging) + log(LOG_AUTHPRIV, "mac_bsdextended: %d:%d request %d" + " on %d:%d failed. \n", cred->cr_ruid, + cred->cr_rgid, acc_mode, vap->va_uid, + vap->va_gid); + return (EACCES); + } + + /* + * If the rule matched, permits access, and first match is enabled, + * return success. + */ + if (ugidfw_firstmatch_enabled) + return (EJUSTRETURN); + else + return (0); +} + +static int +ugidfw_check(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap, + int acc_mode) +{ + int error, i; + + /* + * Since we do not separately handle append, map append to write. + */ + if (acc_mode & MBI_APPEND) { + acc_mode &= ~MBI_APPEND; + acc_mode |= MBI_WRITE; + } + mtx_lock(&ugidfw_mtx); + for (i = 0; i < rule_slots; i++) { + if (rules[i] == NULL) + continue; + error = ugidfw_rulecheck(rules[i], cred, + vp, vap, acc_mode); + if (error == EJUSTRETURN) + break; + if (error) { + mtx_unlock(&ugidfw_mtx); + return (error); + } + } + mtx_unlock(&ugidfw_mtx); + return (0); +} + +static int +ugidfw_check_vp(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int acc_mode) +{ + int error; + struct vattr vap; + + if (!ugidfw_enabled) + return (0); + error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred); + if (error) + return (error); + return (ugidfw_check(cred, vp, &vap, acc_mode)); +} + +/* + * Object-specific entry point implementations are sorted alphabetically by + * object type and then by operation. + */ +static int +ugidfw_system_check_acct(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel) +{ + + if (vp != NULL) + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE)); + else + return (0); +} + +static int +ugidfw_system_check_auditctl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel) +{ + + if (vp != NULL) + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE)); + else + return (0); +} + +static int +ugidfw_system_check_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, int acc_mode) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, acc_mode)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_EXEC)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_EXEC)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_check_create_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel, struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_WRITE)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, acl_type_t type) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_ADMIN)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_deleteextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, int attrnamespace, const char *name) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, struct image_params *imgp, + struct label *execlabel) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_READ|MBI_EXEC)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, acl_type_t type) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_STAT)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, int attrnamespace, const char *name, + struct uio *uio) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_READ)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_link(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, + struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + error = ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_WRITE); + if (error) + return (error); + error = ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE); + if (error) + return (error); + return (0); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_listextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, int attrnamespace) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_READ)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel, struct componentname *cnp) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_EXEC)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, int acc_mode) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, acc_mode)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_READ)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_readdlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_READ)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel, + struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + error = ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_WRITE); + if (error) + return (error); + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel, + int samedir, struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + error = ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_WRITE); + if (error) + return (error); + if (vp != NULL) + error = ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE); + return (error); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_ADMIN)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_check_setacl_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, acl_type_t type, struct acl *acl) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_ADMIN)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, int attrnamespace, const char *name, + struct uio *uio) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, u_long flags) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_ADMIN)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, mode_t mode) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_ADMIN)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_ADMIN)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vplabel, struct timespec atime, struct timespec utime) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_ADMIN)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_stat(struct ucred *active_cred, + struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel) +{ + + return (ugidfw_check_vp(active_cred, vp, MBI_STAT)); +} + +static int +ugidfw_vnode_check_unlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct label *dvplabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel, + struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + error = ugidfw_check_vp(cred, dvp, MBI_WRITE); + if (error) + return (error); + return (ugidfw_check_vp(cred, vp, MBI_WRITE)); +} + +static struct mac_policy_ops ugidfw_ops = +{ + .mpo_destroy = ugidfw_destroy, + .mpo_init = ugidfw_init, + .mpo_system_check_acct = ugidfw_system_check_acct, + .mpo_system_check_auditctl = ugidfw_system_check_auditctl, + .mpo_system_check_swapon = ugidfw_system_check_swapon, + .mpo_vnode_check_access = ugidfw_vnode_check_access, + .mpo_vnode_check_chdir = ugidfw_vnode_check_chdir, + .mpo_vnode_check_chroot = ugidfw_vnode_check_chroot, + .mpo_vnode_check_create = ugidfw_check_create_vnode, + .mpo_vnode_check_deleteacl = ugidfw_vnode_check_deleteacl, + .mpo_vnode_check_deleteextattr = ugidfw_vnode_check_deleteextattr, + .mpo_vnode_check_exec = ugidfw_vnode_check_exec, + .mpo_vnode_check_getacl = ugidfw_vnode_check_getacl, + .mpo_vnode_check_getextattr = ugidfw_vnode_check_getextattr, + .mpo_vnode_check_link = ugidfw_vnode_check_link, + .mpo_vnode_check_listextattr = ugidfw_vnode_check_listextattr, + .mpo_vnode_check_lookup = ugidfw_vnode_check_lookup, + .mpo_vnode_check_open = ugidfw_vnode_check_open, + .mpo_vnode_check_readdir = ugidfw_vnode_check_readdir, + .mpo_vnode_check_readlink = ugidfw_vnode_check_readdlink, + .mpo_vnode_check_rename_from = ugidfw_vnode_check_rename_from, + .mpo_vnode_check_rename_to = ugidfw_vnode_check_rename_to, + .mpo_vnode_check_revoke = ugidfw_vnode_check_revoke, + .mpo_vnode_check_setacl = ugidfw_check_setacl_vnode, + .mpo_vnode_check_setextattr = ugidfw_vnode_check_setextattr, + .mpo_vnode_check_setflags = ugidfw_vnode_check_setflags, + .mpo_vnode_check_setmode = ugidfw_vnode_check_setmode, + .mpo_vnode_check_setowner = ugidfw_vnode_check_setowner, + .mpo_vnode_check_setutimes = ugidfw_vnode_check_setutimes, + .mpo_vnode_check_stat = ugidfw_vnode_check_stat, + .mpo_vnode_check_unlink = ugidfw_vnode_check_unlink, +}; + +MAC_POLICY_SET(&ugidfw_ops, mac_bsdextended, "TrustedBSD MAC/BSD Extended", + MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL, 0); Copied: head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/ugidfw_vnode.c (from r184328, head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/ugidfw_vnode.c Mon Oct 27 11:46:19 2008 (r184330, copy of r184328, head/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c) @@ -0,0 +1,768 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2007 Robert N. M. Watson + * Copyright (c) 2001-2005 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. + * Copyright (c) 2005 Tom Rhodes + * Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project. + * It was later enhanced by Tom Rhodes for the TrustedBSD Project. + * + * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network + * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network + * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), + * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. + * + * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract + * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS"). + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $FreeBSD$ + */ + +/* + * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. + * + * "BSD Extended" MAC policy, allowing the administrator to impose mandatory + * firewall-like rules regarding users and file system objects. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +static struct mtx ugidfw_mtx; + +SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac); + +SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, bsdextended, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, + "TrustedBSD extended BSD MAC policy controls"); + +static int ugidfw_enabled = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW, + &ugidfw_enabled, 0, "Enforce extended BSD policy"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.bsdextended.enabled", &ugidfw_enabled); + +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACBSDEXTENDED, "mac_bsdextended", "BSD Extended MAC rule"); + +#define MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES 250 +static struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rules[MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES]; +static int rule_count = 0; +static int rule_slots = 0; +static int rule_version = MB_VERSION; + +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rule_count, CTLFLAG_RD, + &rule_count, 0, "Number of defined rules\n"); +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rule_slots, CTLFLAG_RD, + &rule_slots, 0, "Number of used rule slots\n"); +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rule_version, CTLFLAG_RD, + &rule_version, 0, "Version number for API\n"); + +/* + * This is just used for logging purposes, eventually we would like to log + * much more then failed requests. + */ +static int ugidfw_logging; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, logging, CTLFLAG_RW, + &ugidfw_logging, 0, "Log failed authorization requests"); + +/* + * This tunable is here for compatibility. It will allow the user to switch + * between the new mode (first rule matches) and the old functionality (all + * rules match). + */ +static int ugidfw_firstmatch_enabled; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, firstmatch_enabled, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ugidfw_firstmatch_enabled, 1, + "Disable/enable match first rule functionality"); + +static int +ugidfw_rule_valid(struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rule) +{ + + if ((rule->mbr_subject.mbs_flags | MBS_ALL_FLAGS) != MBS_ALL_FLAGS) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_subject.mbs_neg | MBS_ALL_FLAGS) != MBS_ALL_FLAGS) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_object.mbo_flags | MBO_ALL_FLAGS) != MBO_ALL_FLAGS) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg | MBO_ALL_FLAGS) != MBO_ALL_FLAGS) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_object.mbo_neg | MBO_TYPE_DEFINED) && + (rule->mbr_object.mbo_type | MBO_ALL_TYPE) != MBO_ALL_TYPE) + return (EINVAL); + if ((rule->mbr_mode | MBI_ALLPERM) != MBI_ALLPERM) + return (EINVAL); + return (0); +} + +static int +sysctl_rule(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) +{ + struct mac_bsdextended_rule temprule, *ruleptr; + u_int namelen; + int error, index, *name; + + error = 0; + name = (int *)arg1; + namelen = arg2; + if (namelen != 1) + return (EINVAL); + index = name[0]; + if (index >= MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES) + return (ENOENT); + + ruleptr = NULL; + if (req->newptr && req->newlen != 0) { + error = SYSCTL_IN(req, &temprule, sizeof(temprule)); + if (error) + return (error); + ruleptr = malloc(sizeof(*ruleptr), M_MACBSDEXTENDED, + M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + } + + mtx_lock(&ugidfw_mtx); + if (req->oldptr) { + if (index < 0 || index > rule_slots + 1) { + error = ENOENT; + goto out; + } + if (rules[index] == NULL) { + error = ENOENT; + goto out; + } + temprule = *rules[index]; + } + if (req->newptr && req->newlen == 0) { + KASSERT(ruleptr == NULL, ("sysctl_rule: ruleptr != NULL")); + ruleptr = rules[index]; + if (ruleptr == NULL) { + error = ENOENT; + goto out; + } + rule_count--; + rules[index] = NULL; + } else if (req->newptr) { + error = ugidfw_rule_valid(&temprule); + if (error) + goto out; + if (rules[index] == NULL) { + *ruleptr = temprule; + rules[index] = ruleptr; + ruleptr = NULL; + if (index + 1 > rule_slots) + rule_slots = index + 1; + rule_count++; + } else + *rules[index] = temprule; + } +out: + mtx_unlock(&ugidfw_mtx); + if (ruleptr != NULL) + free(ruleptr, M_MACBSDEXTENDED); + if (req->oldptr && error == 0) + error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &temprule, sizeof(temprule)); + return (error); +} + +SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rules, CTLFLAG_RW, + sysctl_rule, "BSD extended MAC rules"); + +static void +ugidfw_init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc) +{ + + mtx_init(&ugidfw_mtx, "mac_bsdextended lock", NULL, MTX_DEF); +} + +static void +ugidfw_destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc) +{ + + mtx_destroy(&ugidfw_mtx); +} + +static int +ugidfw_rulecheck(struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rule, + struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap, int acc_mode) +{ + int mac_granted, match, priv_granted; + int i; + *** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***