From owner-freebsd-net@FreeBSD.ORG Sat Apr 24 08:43:28 2004 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-net@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD5C416A4CE for ; Sat, 24 Apr 2004 08:43:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from web80105.mail.yahoo.com (web80105.mail.yahoo.com [66.163.169.78]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 94FE243D5D for ; Sat, 24 Apr 2004 08:43:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from evans.alan@sbcglobal.net) Message-ID: <20040424154328.24028.qmail@web80105.mail.yahoo.com> Received: from [66.124.150.213] by web80105.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP; Sat, 24 Apr 2004 08:43:28 PDT Date: Sat, 24 Apr 2004 08:43:28 -0700 (PDT) From: Alan Evans To: Andre Oppermann , Chuck Swiger In-Reply-To: <408A863E.B6E60792@freebsd.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii cc: Alan Evans cc: net@freebsd.org Subject: Re: TCP vulnerability X-BeenThere: freebsd-net@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Networking and TCP/IP with FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 24 Apr 2004 15:43:28 -0000 I agree, but what's most important is to maintain backward compatibility. If one breaks it, it's a DoS is some sense. I also saw some postings on NetBSD which does ratelimiting of ACKs (in response to SYNs), and ACKs RST. IMHO, the latter is bogus - why ACK a RST? And, the former may impose an artificial limit of some sort. Alan Evans --- Andre Oppermann wrote: > Chuck Swiger wrote: > > > > Alan Evans wrote: > > > I'm sure FreeBSD is vulnerable. > > > > > > > http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA04-111A.html > > > > > > There's a draft that (sort of) addresses this. > Should > > > we adopt it? > > > > This issue is being discussed on freebsd-security > now, and Mike Silbersack > > has some patches available for > review and testing. > > There has been an additional problem in some BSD > stacks with RST's > which has been fixed in FreeBSD about six years ago. > The remaining > things which are addressed in that paper are > hardening measures to > reduce the chances of a brute force blind attack. > There *no* vulner- > ablility in the sense of "send packet x" and > everything breaks. > > -- > Andre