From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Apr 17 20:08:49 2008 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E5D3106566B for ; Thu, 17 Apr 2008 20:08:49 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from des@des.no) Received: from tim.des.no (tim.des.no [194.63.250.121]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E85C8FC17 for ; Thu, 17 Apr 2008 20:08:49 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from des@des.no) Received: from ds4.des.no (des.no [80.203.243.180]) by smtp.des.no (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25C352089; Thu, 17 Apr 2008 21:52:13 +0200 (CEST) From: =?utf-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=C3=B8rgrav?= To: Matthew Seaman References: <4807423D.1090206@infracaninophile.co.uk> Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2008 21:52:12 +0200 In-Reply-To: <4807423D.1090206@infracaninophile.co.uk> (Matthew Seaman's message of "Thu\, 17 Apr 2008 13\:27\:41 +0100") Message-ID: <86d4oow977.fsf@ds4.des.no> User-Agent: Gnus/5.110006 (No Gnus v0.6) Emacs/23.0.60 (berkeley-unix) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, Ian Smith Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:05.openssh X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2008 20:08:49 -0000 Matthew Seaman writes: > Hmmm... something that wasn't immediately clear to me reading the > advisory: the requirement for an attacker to listen(2) on tcp port > 6010 means that they have to have a login on the box being attacked. > ie. it's a *local* information leak rather than a network attack. It > took me some time and a few gentle thwaps with the clue stick by > colleagues better versed in the sockets API than me before I > understood that. Yes, it's an interesting vulnerability. The attacker needs to be able to execute code that listens to localhost:60XX on the server, but the attack is directed at the client, not the server. You could say that the workaround (on the server) is a mere courtesy to the client on the part of the server - although of course the attacker could use this to sniff the server's root password or hijack a root shell, so it's not quite so clear-cut. DES --=20 Dag-Erling Sm=C3=B8rgrav - des@des.no