From owner-freebsd-security Wed Nov 3 14:26:36 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from alcanet.com.au (border.alcanet.com.au [203.62.196.10]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04AE0150E6 for ; Wed, 3 Nov 1999 14:26:30 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from jeremyp@gsmx07.alcatel.com.au) Received: by border.alcanet.com.au id <40370>; Thu, 4 Nov 1999 09:17:50 +1100 Content-return: prohibited Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1999 09:23:15 +1100 From: Peter Jeremy Subject: Re: Examining FBSD set[ug]ids and their use In-reply-to: To: Robert Watson Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Reply-To: peter.jeremy@Alcatel.com.au Message-Id: <99Nov4.091750est.40370@border.alcanet.com.au> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0pre3i Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii References: <14367.64514.294218.824898@anarcat.dyndns.org> Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org On 1999-Nov-04 04:29:38 +1100, Robert Watson wrote: >However, I don't like that /usr/bin/uustat is still owned by UUCP, and ... >Same goes for man -- /usr/bin/man is owned by uid man, so anyone who >breaks the manpage sandbox can modify it, and abscond with the privileges >of any user running man. Another option (at least for us) is to mark them system immutable (schg). That stops them being modified by their owner (though it is more a work-around than a real fix). > Man should really use a gid, not a uid, so that >the man binary doesn't have to by writable by the sandbox. In this case, this would be a reasonable change, and I can't see any immediate problems. Peter To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message