From owner-freebsd-current Tue Jul 18 7:47:49 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from spirit.jaded.net (shortbus.jaded.net [216.94.132.8]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5EEC837BE58; Tue, 18 Jul 2000 07:47:44 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from dan@spirit.jaded.net) Received: (from dan@localhost) by spirit.jaded.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) id KAA01297; Tue, 18 Jul 2000 10:47:35 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from dan) Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2000 10:47:35 -0400 From: Dan Moschuk To: David Malone Cc: Kris Kennaway , Mark Murray , Poul-Henning Kamp , current@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak Message-ID: <20000718104735.D1221@spirit.jaded.net> References: <200007171459.QAA00888@grimreaper.grondar.za> <20000718111534.A20086@walton.maths.tcd.ie> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2i In-Reply-To: <20000718111534.A20086@walton.maths.tcd.ie>; from dwmalone@maths.tcd.ie on Tue, Jul 18, 2000 at 11:15:34AM +0100 Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG | I think there are other practical issues too. Unless the new libfetch | fetch supports https this won't work. More to the point, I'd | guess https needs a working /dev/random to set up the secure | connection, but we're running fetch to set up /dev/random. | | How much entropy can we get from: | | (date; dmesg ; sysctl -X; vmstat -i ) > /dev/random | | Just playing it looks like you might get 4 so bits from the | rtc and clk interupt count alone. None. Any data that is publically available via userland should not be used for cryptography. -Dan To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message