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Date:      Fri, 08 Sep 2000 10:54:50 +0100
From:      David Pick <D.M.Pick@qmw.ac.uk>
To:        "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
Cc:        "Vladimir Mencl, MK, susSED" <mencl@nenya.ms.mff.cuni.cz>, "Andrey A. Chernov" <ache@nagual.pp.ru>, Warner Losh <imp@village.org>, Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.ORG>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG, security-officer@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: UNIX locale format string vulnerability (fwd) 
Message-ID:  <E13XKrz-00050c-00@xi.css.qmw.ac.uk>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 07 Sep 2000 16:15:55 MDT." <200009072215.e87MFtQ24652@xerxes.courtesan.com> 

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> Sudo already discards the following:
>     IFS
>     LOCALDOMAIN
>     RES_OPTIONS
>     HOSTALIASES
>     LD_*
>     _RLD*
>     SHLIB_PATH
>     LIBPATH
>     KRB_CONF
>     KRB5_CONFIG
>     ENV
>     BASH_ENV

A fair list of not-obviously-related environment variables. (Puts
on thinking cap and makes a correlation with packet filter rules.)
It would be *much* safer to adopt a "deny all and only allow a
list of variables that are known to be safe and wanted" approach
rather than a "block the ones we know are unsafe and miss blocking
a few we don't know about".

-- 
	David Pick



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