Date: Fri, 04 Jun 2004 23:57:51 +0100 From: Colin Percival <colin.percival@wadham.ox.ac.uk> To: "Crist J. Clark" <cjc@freebsd.org> Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: syslogd(8) Dropping Privs Message-ID: <6.1.0.6.1.20040604235214.03fec120@popserver.sfu.ca> In-Reply-To: <20040604195338.GA50275@blossom.cjclark.org> References: <20040604195338.GA50275@blossom.cjclark.org>
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At 20:53 04/06/2004, Crist J. Clark wrote: >We haven't had many syslogd(8) vulnerabilities lately, but one >less daemon running as root seems like a Good Thing. I do not >see any drawbacks from a security point of view. The log files >would have to be owned, or otherwise writeable, by this other >user, but so what. Obviously, I may be missing something. One consideration is that if syslogd is not running as root, it will no longer be able to write to a filesystem which is already "full". On systems where non-root users can write to the filesystem containing /var/log (and are not limited by quotas) this would allow non-root users to disable logging, which would probably be a Bad Thing. Colin Percival
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