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Date:      Sat, 20 Feb 2016 18:08:20 +0000 (UTC)
From:      Warren Block <wblock@FreeBSD.org>
To:        doc-committers@freebsd.org, svn-doc-all@freebsd.org, svn-doc-head@freebsd.org
Subject:   svn commit: r48225 - head/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/jails
Message-ID:  <201602201808.u1KI8Kal006673@repo.freebsd.org>

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Author: wblock
Date: Sat Feb 20 18:08:19 2016
New Revision: 48225
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/doc/48225

Log:
  Whitespace-only fixes, translators please ignore.

Modified:
  head/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/jails/chapter.xml

Modified: head/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/jails/chapter.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/jails/chapter.xml	Sat Feb 20 16:23:46 2016	(r48224)
+++ head/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/jails/chapter.xml	Sat Feb 20 18:08:19 2016	(r48225)
@@ -31,17 +31,17 @@
       performance, reliability, and security.</para>
 
     <para>Jails build upon the &man.chroot.2; concept, which is used
-      to change the root directory of a set of processes.  This creates a
-      safe environment, separate from the rest of the system.
-      Processes created in the chrooted environment can not access
-      files or resources outside of it.  For that reason, compromising
-      a service running in a chrooted environment should not allow the
-      attacker to compromise the entire system.  However, a chroot has
-      several limitations.  It is suited to easy tasks which do not
-      require much flexibility or complex, advanced features.  Over
-      time, many ways have been found to escape from a chrooted
-      environment, making it a less than ideal solution for securing
-      services.</para>
+      to change the root directory of a set of processes.  This
+      creates a safe environment, separate from the rest of the
+      system.  Processes created in the chrooted environment can not
+      access files or resources outside of it.  For that reason,
+      compromising a service running in a chrooted environment should
+      not allow the attacker to compromise the entire system.
+      However, a chroot has several limitations.  It is suited to easy
+      tasks which do not require much flexibility or complex, advanced
+      features.  Over time, many ways have been found to escape from a
+      chrooted environment, making it a less than ideal solution for
+      securing services.</para>
 
     <para>Jails improve on the concept of the traditional chroot
       environment in several ways.  In a traditional chroot



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