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Date:      Mon, 27 Sep 1999 19:04:19 -0500
From:      TrouBle <trouble@hackfurby.com>
To:        Carol Deihl <carol@tinker.com>
Cc:        freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG, freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: chroot could chdir? (was Re: about jail)
Message-ID:  <37F00602.96D098D3@hackfurby.com>
References:  <199909251302.RAA58030@grendel.sovlink.ru> <19990925171712.A80535@zenon.net> <37EEA27E.244DCF9A@tinker.com>

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Ummm sorry but i think you have goten this backwards it is more secure to
chdir, then chrrot, not chroot then chdir....  I believe what you have here is
backwards


>
> As we all know, the chroot can be escaped because the sample
> program doesn't change the current working directory, and it's
> still pointing outside the chrooted area.
>
> What if chroot itself chdir'ed to it's new root directory? Would
> this break existing programs? I'd expect that well-behaved
> programs would chdir someplace useful before continuing anyway.
>
> At the very end of chroot(), could it just
>         vrele(fdp->fd_cdir);
>         fdp->fd_cdir = nd.ni_vp;
> before it returns, setting the current dir to the same place it
> just chrooted to?
>
> Carol
> --
> Carol Deihl - principal, Shrier and Deihl - mailto:carol@tinker.com
> Remote Unix Network Admin, Security, Internet Software Development
>   Tinker Internet Services - Superior FreeBSD-based Web Hosting
>                      http://www.tinker.com/
>
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