Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 01:51:50 +0000 From: bugzilla-noreply@freebsd.org To: bugs@FreeBSD.org Subject: [Bug 227605] [OCF] encrypt_multi/decrypt_multi process too many data Message-ID: <bug-227605-227-XaOpNrl1N0@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/> In-Reply-To: <bug-227605-227@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/> References: <bug-227605-227@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/>
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https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D227605 --- Comment #1 from Conrad Meyer <cem@freebsd.org> --- Nice find. It seems like this can only happen if passed an mbuf chain or u= io longer than crd_len. Does using the API like this actually make sense? We could maybe add an assertion that buffer input sizes matches crd_len (+ crd_skip). In the case of esp_input(), it seems like m_split() could be used to separa= te the authentication portion from the encrypted contents before passing to crypto_dispatch(). OTOH, your patch looks totally correct. I would additionally cast i to siz= e_t to avoid ambiguity in comparison signedness in min() macro. --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are the assignee for the bug.=
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