From owner-freebsd-rc@FreeBSD.ORG  Thu Sep  6 21:36:43 2012
Return-Path: <owner-freebsd-rc@FreeBSD.ORG>
Delivered-To: freebsd-rc@FreeBSD.org
Received: by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 664)
	id 1609C1065674; Thu,  6 Sep 2012 21:36:43 +0000 (UTC)
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 14:36:42 -0700
From: David O'Brien <obrien@FreeBSD.org>
To: Dag-Erling =?unknown-8bit?B?U23DuHJncmF2?= <des@des.no>
Message-ID: <20120906213642.GA18396@dragon.NUXI.org>
References: <201208222337.q7MNbORo017642@svn.freebsd.org>
	<5043E449.8050005@FreeBSD.org>
	<20120904220126.GA85339@dragon.NUXI.org>
	<50468326.8070009@FreeBSD.org>
	<20120906164514.GA14757@dragon.NUXI.org>
	<867gs7qcsl.fsf@ds4.des.no>
	<20120906184400.GF13179@dragon.NUXI.org>
	<86lignot6a.fsf@ds4.des.no>
	<20120906200325.GA17159@dragon.NUXI.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20120906200325.GA17159@dragon.NUXI.org>
X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 10.0-CURRENT
X-to-the-FBI-CIA-and-NSA: HI! HOW YA DOIN? can i haz chizburger?
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14)
Cc: Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org,
	Doug Barton <dougb@FreeBSD.org>, freebsd-rc@FreeBSD.org,
	Mark Murray <markm@FreeBSD.org>
Subject: Re: svn commit: r239598 - head/etc/rc.d
X-BeenThere: freebsd-rc@freebsd.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
Reply-To: obrien@freebsd.org
List-Id: "Discussion related to /etc/rc.d design and implementation."
	<freebsd-rc.freebsd.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-rc>,
	<mailto:freebsd-rc-request@freebsd.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-rc>
List-Post: <mailto:freebsd-rc@freebsd.org>
List-Help: <mailto:freebsd-rc-request@freebsd.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-rc>,
	<mailto:freebsd-rc-request@freebsd.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2012 21:36:43 -0000

On Thu, Sep 06, 2012 at 01:03:25PM -0700, David O'Brien (@FreeBSD) wrote:
> I already said an attacker could have a local login on the system.
> That would give them full knowledge of the kenv output.
> Same attacker can figure out the 'date' output from uptime, etc...

Note that this flies somewhat in the face of my argument for 'postrandom'
based on Schneier's writings on deleting the seed file after it used.

Please remember this is for better_than_nothing().

I like Arthur's patch that avoids calling better_than_nothing() if we
feed_dev_random() with ${entropy_file}.

-- 
-- David  (obrien@FreeBSD.org)