Date: Mon, 30 Sep 1996 19:53:14 +0200 (MET DST) From: guido@gvr.win.tue.nl (Guido van Rooij) To: marcs@znep.com (Marc Slemko) Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: setuid programs in freebsd Message-ID: <199609301753.TAA10693@gvr.win.tue.nl> In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.3.95.960929214259.16956L-100000@alive.ampr.ab.ca> from Marc Slemko at "Sep 29, 96 09:55:48 pm"
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> > 7836 24 -r-sr-xr-x 1 root bin 12288 Jul 16 20:30 ./usr/bin/keyinit > > USE: Used by the S/Key authentication system to initialize the use of > S/Key one time passwords for logins. > > IMPACT: Removing the setuid flag from keyinit means that the S/Key > authentication system will no longer be functional on your system. Nottrue. It only means users can not setup skeys for themselves. > > COMMENTS: *** Pointer to S/Key info. *** Does S/Key need to be setuid > root? Yes. > 7843 24 -r-sr-xr-x 1 root bin 12288 Jul 16 20:30 ./usr/bin/lock > > USE: Allows the user to 'lock' their terminal from being used until > either the given password or login password (depending on command line > options) is given or the program times out. > > IMPACT: *** None?!?! (won't let user use login password to disable) s-bit is indeed necessary to check a users password. > > COMMENTS: There was a security hole in rlogin that was patched soon > after the 2.1.5 release. I have not investigated it in depth, nor > have I heard of any exploits for it, but it is possible that the hole > discovered could allow others to gain root access to your system. *** > more info, pointer to fixed binary? In many environments, rlogin can > not be disabled without having an unacceptable impact on system > usability. ** add not on rlogin and host based auth in general? There was a bug in rlogind, a portential buffer overflow that was not exploitable. -Guido
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