From owner-freebsd-security Mon Sep 11 23:10: 6 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mail2.netcologne.de (mail2.netcologne.de [194.8.194.103]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EEFD837B422 for ; Mon, 11 Sep 2000 23:10:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bagabeedaboo.security.at12.de (dial-213-168-73-82.netcologne.de [213.168.73.82]) by mail2.netcologne.de (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA02782 for ; Tue, 12 Sep 2000 08:10:02 +0200 (MET DST) Received: from localhost (localhost.security.at12.de [127.0.0.1]) by bagabeedaboo.security.at12.de (8.11.0/8.11.0) with ESMTP id e8C69uS00502 for ; Tue, 12 Sep 2000 08:09:56 +0200 (CEST) (envelope-from pherman@frenchfries.net) Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2000 08:09:56 +0200 (CEST) From: Paul Herman To: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: init securelevel 1 -> 0, dangerous? Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Hi, Does anyone know of any dangers of letting init lower the securelevel to zero for single user mode? What I already know is that allowing gdb to attach (via ptrace(2)) to init (to trick it into lowering securelevel) is forbiden in kern/sys_process.c (or kern/kern_prot.c in -CURRENT) I asked -hackers and -current a week ago, but got no concrete answers, so I thought I'd ask one last time on -security. There is an open PR on this... Ideas? -Paul. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message