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Date:      Wed, 4 Apr 2012 17:34:12 +0000 (UTC)
From:      jb <jb.1234abcd@gmail.com>
To:        freebsd-stable@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: Text relocations in kernel modules
Message-ID:  <loom.20120404T192618-4@post.gmane.org>
References:  <CAGE5yCpuvsVrc-%2BDTVas-W4fjuP2s%2B6PQONMOTyEbGnj2CY3ig@mail.gmail.com> <4F766F29.2030803@cs.stonybrook.edu> <CAFHbX1KiZx68MP4bCAvPc0Zui3fA4O35_z3kP781zoJqLYp7Bw@mail.gmail.com> <4F79D88B.3040102@cs.stonybrook.edu> <CAFHbX1KE15G9gx7Duw2R8zC5jL1jiEir0yMB0-s5%2B4xx517WtQ@mail.gmail.com> <4F79E27E.3000509@cs.stonybrook.edu> <CAGE5yCrwLosuTT2yq0DEx%2Bz8ztKpkrB=tORmURcuh_SCz=L7qg@mail.gmail.com> <4F79FCB8.1090003@cs.stonybrook.edu> <CAGE5yCrz45AWeJGv=2UWRq7xpXZVtvsx%2B5O6cvaE6ZzoFrz5mA@mail.gmail.com> <4F7A05C4.9070808@cs.stonybrook.edu> <20120403170259.GA94837@neutralgood.org> <loom.20120404T103230-175@post.gmane.org> <1333550029.1090.67.camel@revolution.hippie.lan> <loom.20120404T165909-66@post.gmane.org> <CAGE5yCoZuyUhuWRc0orYkB2wuuESuBzzoRNqOvWr-G=a1XOJDA@mail.gmail.com>

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Peter Wemm <peter <at> wemm.org> writes:

> ...
> There is no way to interfere because it is done outside of user space
> entirely, **after** the file has been copied out of the file system.
> You can do whatever you like to the file, but it has no effect because
> all the relocation is done in a private kernel copy.
> ...

What if attack code (broadly understood) is part of module code, and is based
on either or both of:
- hidden (as to meaning and reloc targets) arrangement of relocations needed
- has an ability of (self) activation during load/link and *relocations* process
already under the privilege of the kernel ?

Is that possible at all ?
Would there be any protection against it (except giving up relocations as
an enabling vehicle) ?

jb





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