From owner-svn-ports-all@freebsd.org Sun Jan 14 02:19:48 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-all@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4E25E6F3BD; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 02:19:48 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from woodsb02@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8CA528F5; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 02:19:48 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from woodsb02@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C9C781B6D0; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 02:19:47 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from woodsb02@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id w0E2Jlc0077922; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 02:19:47 GMT (envelope-from woodsb02@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from woodsb02@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id w0E2JlUL077920; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 02:19:47 GMT (envelope-from woodsb02@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201801140219.w0E2JlUL077920@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: woodsb02 set sender to woodsb02@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Ben Woods Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 02:19:47 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r458952 - head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head X-SVN-Commit-Author: woodsb02 X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 458952 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: ports MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.25 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 02:19:48 -0000 Author: woodsb02 Date: Sun Jan 14 02:19:47 2018 New Revision: 458952 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/458952 Log: Document DNS rebinding vulnerabilities in net-p2p/transmission-daemon PR: 225150 Security: https://www.vuxml.org/freebsd/3e5b8bd3-0c32-452f-a60e-beab7b762351.html Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Sun Jan 14 02:04:54 2018 (r458951) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Sun Jan 14 02:19:47 2018 (r458952) @@ -58,6 +58,45 @@ Notes: * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.) --> + + transmission-daemon -- vulnerable to dns rebinding attacks + + + transmission-daemon + 2.92_3 + + + + +

Google Project Zero reports:

+
+

The transmission bittorrent client uses a client/server + architecture, the user interface is the client which communicates + to the worker daemon using JSON RPC requests.

+

As with all HTTP RPC schemes like this, any website can send + requests to the daemon listening on localhost with XMLHttpRequest(), + but the theory is they will be ignored because clients must prove + they can read and set a specific header, X-Transmission-Session-Id. + Unfortunately, this design doesn't work because of an attack called + "DNS rebinding". Any website can simply create a dns name that they + are authorized to communicate with, and then make it resolve to + localhost.

+

Exploitation is simple, you could set script-torrent-done-enabled + and run any command, or set download-dir to /home/user/ and then + upload a torrent for .bashrc.

+
+ +
+ + https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1447 + https://github.com/transmission/transmission/pull/468 + + + 2017-11-30 + 2018-01-14 + +
+ shibboleth-sp -- vulnerable to forged user attribute data