From owner-freebsd-security  Sat Jan 13 16:50:39 2001
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Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2001 16:50:21 -0800
From: "Crist J. Clark" <cjclark@reflexnet.net>
To: Frank Tobin <ftobin@uiuc.edu>
Cc: Dru <genisis@istar.ca>, security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject: Re: opinions on password policies
Message-ID: <20010113165021.I97980@rfx-64-6-211-149.users.reflexco>
Reply-To: cjclark@alum.mit.edu
References: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0101131321210.89486-100000@genisis> <Pine.BSF.4.31.0101131726030.40290-100000@palanthas.neverending.org>
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In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.4.31.0101131726030.40290-100000@palanthas.neverending.org>; from ftobin@uiuc.edu on Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 05:35:51PM -0600
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On Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 05:35:51PM -0600, Frank Tobin wrote:
> While this may not be applicable to your situation, I feel that the best
> policy is to demand public-key authentication.  The reason for this is to
> limit the human factor, not demanding the user remember yet another unique
> password.  If forced to remember another password, most users (including
> myself) will often re-use a password they use at another place.
> 
> If your system is compromised, you do not to help the attackers, who are
> now likely, get into other accounts the user might have other places
> because they reused the pasword.  On the flip side, it would be best that
> if the user was compromised someplace else, it won't help the attackers
> use the authentication information to get into the victim's account on
> your system.  Public-key systems prevent this sort of "chain-reaction"
> account breakage.

I am not sure I understand your argument here. I your system, how does
the _user_ authenticate himself? Biometrics? HW token? Smart card?
Really, no passwords?
-- 
Crist J. Clark                           cjclark@alum.mit.edu


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