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Date:      Fri, 12 Apr 2013 10:14:40 -0400
From:      Juan Mojica <jmojica@gmail.com>
To:        Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc>
Cc:        FreeBSD Net <freebsd-net@freebsd.org>, Rick Macklem <rmacklem@uoguelph.ca>, Andre Oppermann <andre@freebsd.org>, Matt Miller <matt@matthewjmiller.net>
Subject:   Re: panic in tcp_do_segment()
Message-ID:  <CAPKuH-zz_tARNUNs%2BHBsE3XVLk_-zvKxG8F2dG%2BUBeoRinb4XQ@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <20130409184439.GA62925@x2.osted.lan>
References:  <1043692819.529554.1365114790772.JavaMail.root@erie.cs.uoguelph.ca> <CAFc6gu9bmJQ-Uxv7PzspSLDyFz6zE3fV=u7HEumCh6f=YQLU2Q@mail.gmail.com> <5162B474.6060808@freebsd.org> <20130409081652.GA50498@x2.osted.lan> <5163D2D2.2090407@freebsd.org> <20130409184439.GA62925@x2.osted.lan>

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I'm a little late to get back to the email thread, but this is great to
hear.  Changes look good (assuming the goto drop is changed dropunlock).
Thanks guys.


On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 2:44 PM, Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc> wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 09, 2013 at 10:35:30AM +0200, Andre Oppermann wrote:
> > On 09.04.2013 10:16, Peter Holm wrote:
> > > On Mon, Apr 08, 2013 at 02:13:40PM +0200, Andre Oppermann wrote:
> > >> On 05.04.2013 13:09, Matt Miller wrote:
> > >>> Hey Rick,
> > >>>
> > >>> I believe Juan and I have root caused this crash recently.  The
> t_state =
> > >>> 0x1, TCPS_LISTEN, in the link provided at the time of the assertion.
> > >>>
> > >>> In tcp_input(), if we're in TCPS_LISTEN, SO_ACCEPTCONN should be set
> on the
> > >>> socket and we should never enter tcp_do_segment() for this state.  I
> think
> > >>> if you look in your corefile, you'll see the socket *doesn't* have
> this
> > >>> flag set in your case.
> > >>>
> > >>> 1043         /*
> > >>> 1044          * When the socket is accepting connections (the INPCB
> is in
> > >>> LISTEN
> > >>> 1045          * state) we look into the SYN cache if this is a new
> > >>> connection
> > >>> 1046          * attempt or the completion of a previous one.
>  Because listen
> > >>> 1047          * sockets are never in TCPS_ESTABLISHED, the V_tcbinfo
> lock
> > >>> will be
> > >>> 1048          * held in this case.
> > >>> 1049          */
> > >>> 1050         if (so->so_options & SO_ACCEPTCONN) {
> > >>> 1051                 struct in_conninfo inc;
> > >>> 1052
> > >>> 1053                 KASSERT(tp->t_state == TCPS_LISTEN, ("%s: so
> accepting
> > >>> but "
> > >>> 1054                     "tp not listening", __func__));
> > >>> ...
> > >>> 1356                 syncache_add(&inc, &to, th, inp, &so, m, NULL,
> NULL);
> > >>> 1357                 /*
> > >>> 1358                  * Entry added to syncache and mbuf consumed.
> > >>> 1359                  * Everything already unlocked by
> syncache_add().
> > >>> 1360                  */
> > >>> 1361                 INP_INFO_UNLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
> > >>> 1362                 return;
> > >>> 1363         }
> > >>> ...
> > >>> 1384         /*
> > >>> 1385          * Segment belongs to a connection in SYN_SENT,
> ESTABLISHED or
> > >>> later
> > >>> 1386          * state.  tcp_do_segment() always consumes the mbuf
> chain,
> > >>> unlocks
> > >>> 1387          * the inpcb, and unlocks pcbinfo.
> > >>> 1388          */
> > >>> 1389         tcp_do_segment(m, th, so, tp, drop_hdrlen, tlen, iptos,
> > >>> ti_locked);
> > >>>
> > >>> I think this has to do with this patch in soclose() where
> SO_ACCEPTCONN is
> > >>> being turned off in soclose().  I suspect if you look at the other
> threads
> > >>> in your corefile, you'll see one at this point in soclose()
> operating on
> > >>> the same socket as the one in the tcp_do_segment() thread.
> > >>>
> > >>> http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=243627
> > >>>
> > >>>    817                 /*
> > >>>    818                  * Prevent new additions to the accept queues
> due
> > >>>    819                  * to ACCEPT_LOCK races while we are draining
> them.
> > >>>    820                  */
> > >>>    821                 so->so_options &= ~SO_ACCEPTCONN;
> > >>>    822                 while ((sp = TAILQ_FIRST(&so->so_incomp)) !=
> NULL) {
> > >>>    823                         TAILQ_REMOVE(&so->so_incomp, sp,
> so_list);
> > >>>    824                         so->so_incqlen--;
> > >>>    825                         sp->so_qstate &= ~SQ_INCOMP;
> > >>>    826                         sp->so_head = NULL;
> > >>>    827                         ACCEPT_UNLOCK();
> > >>>    828                         soabort(sp);
> > >>>    829                         ACCEPT_LOCK();
> > >>>    830                 }
> > >>>
> > >>> Juan had evaluated this code path and it seemed safe to just drop the
> > >>> packet in this case:
> > >>>
> > >>> +     /*
> > >>> +      * In closing down the socket, the SO_ACCEPTCONN flag is
> removed to
> > >>> +      * prevent new connections from being established.  This means
> that
> > >>> +      * any frames in that were in the midst of being processed
> could
> > >>> +      * make it here.  Need to just drop the frame.
> > >>> +      */
> > >>> +     if (TCPS_LISTEN == tp->t_state) {
> > >>> +         TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvwhileclosing);
> > >>> +         goto drop;
> > >>> +     }
> > >>>         KASSERT(tp->t_state > TCPS_LISTEN, ("%s: TCPS_LISTEN",
> > >>>             __func__));
> > >>>
> > >>> Or, if there's someone more familiar with the locking in these
> paths, they
> > >>> may be able to come up with a way to restructure the locks and logic
> to
> > >>> close this window.
> > >>
> > >> Matt, Juan,
> > >>
> > >> excellent analysis.  I don't see a better approach to handle this
> > >> under the current ACCEPT_LOCK model.
> > >>
> > >> Compared to your patch I'd like to handle this race earlier before
> > >> we hit tcp_do_segment().
> > >>
> > >> Could you please review the attached patch which handles it right
> > >> after the SO_ACCEPTCONN / syncache check?
> > >>
> > >> --
> > >> Andre
> > >>
> > >> Index: netinet/tcp_input.c
> > >> ===================================================================
> > >> --- netinet/tcp_input.c    (revision 249253)
> > >> +++ netinet/tcp_input.c    (working copy)
> > >> @@ -1351,6 +1351,16 @@
> > >>                     */
> > >>                    INP_INFO_UNLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
> > >>                    return;
> > >> +  } else if (tp->t_state == TCPS_LISTEN) {
> > >> +          /*
> > >> +           * When a listen socket is torn down the SO_ACCEPTCONN
> > >> +           * flag is removed first while connections are drained
> > >> +           * from the accept queue in a unlock/lock cycle of the
> > >> +           * ACCEPT_LOCK, opening a race condition allowing a SYN
> > >> +           * attempt go through unhandled.
> > >> +           */
> > >> +          TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvdwhileclosing);
> > >> +          goto drop;
> > >>            }
> > >>
> > >>    #ifdef TCP_SIGNATURE
> > >
> > > I was able to reproduce the original "panic: tcp_do_segment:
> > > TCPS_LISTEN" with ease; see
> > > http://people.freebsd.org/~pho/stress/log/tcp.txt.
> > >
> > > With your patch (minus the TCPSTAT_INC) I got this "panic: Lock (rw)
> > > tcp locked @ netinet/tcp_input.c:1432."
> > >
> > > http://people.freebsd.org/~pho/stress/log/tcp2.txt
> >
> > Please replace the 'goto drop' with 'goto dropunlock' to fix the panic.
> >
>
> Yes, this seems to take care of the two problems reported. Tested for
> 5 hours without any repeats.
>
> - Peter
>



-- 
Juan Mojica
Email: jmojica@gmail.com



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