From owner-freebsd-security Thu Dec 24 14:56:27 1998 Return-Path: Received: (from majordom@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id OAA01546 for freebsd-security-outgoing; Thu, 24 Dec 1998 14:56:27 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG) Received: from trooper.velocet.ca (host-034.canadiantire.ca [209.146.201.34]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id OAA01538 for ; Thu, 24 Dec 1998 14:56:18 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from dgilbert@trooper.velocet.ca) Received: (from dgilbert@localhost) by trooper.velocet.ca (8.8.7/8.8.7) id RAA06040; Thu, 24 Dec 1998 17:55:44 -0500 (EST) From: David Gilbert MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <13954.50798.838080.934663@trooper.velocet.ca> Date: Thu, 24 Dec 1998 17:55:42 -0500 (EST) To: Dag-Erling Smorgrav Cc: Casper , "freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG" Subject: Re: Magic In-Reply-To: References: <3682A65B.8CFB144F@acc.am> X-Mailer: VM 6.62 under Emacs 19.34.2 Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org >>>>> "Dag-Erling" == Dag-Erling Smorgrav writes: Dag-Erling> Search the archives - there was a thread two or three Dag-Erling> months back about randomizing syscall numbers to make it Dag-Erling> hard for intruders to execute foreign executables. I've thought for some time that requiring a signature on binaries before execution would be a cool idea. Obviously, this would slow execution by some factor (although binaries could be cached as already checked), but on secure systems it would be worth it. To go farter, you could require suid executables and executables that run as certain users to be singed by more trusted keys. You might put more stringent restrictions on what root can run than other users, and still different restrictions on what executables can change their userid. Dave. -- ============================================================================ |David Gilbert, Velocet Communications. | Two things can only be | |Mail: dgilbert@velocet.net | equal if and only if they | |http://www.velocet.net/~dgilbert | are precisely opposite. | =========================================================GLO================ To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message