Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 08:22:56 +0000 (UTC) From: Martin Wilke <miwi@FreeBSD.org> To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r341695 - head/security/vuxml Message-ID: <201401290822.s0T8Mu7w037455@svn.freebsd.org>
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Author: miwi Date: Wed Jan 29 08:22:56 2014 New Revision: 341695 URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/341695 QAT: https://qat.redports.org/buildarchive/r341695/ Log: - Fix format Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Wed Jan 29 08:11:01 2014 (r341694) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Wed Jan 29 08:22:56 2014 (r341695) @@ -63,7 +63,12 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beg <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">; <p>Florian Weimer of the Red Hat Product Security Team reports:</p> <blockquote cite="http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/contrib/socat-secadv5.txt">; - <p>Due to a missing check during assembly of the HTTP request line a long target server name in the PROXY-CONNECT address can cause a stack buffer overrun. Exploitation requires that the attacker is able to provide the target server name to the PROXY-CONNECT address in the command line. This can happen for example in scripts that receive data from untrusted sources.</p> + <p>Due to a missing check during assembly of the HTTP request line a long + target server name in the PROXY-CONNECT address can cause a stack buffer + overrun. Exploitation requires that the attacker is able to provide the + target server name to the PROXY-CONNECT address in the command line. + This can happen for example in scripts that receive data from untrusted + sources.</p> </blockquote> </body> </description> @@ -115,7 +120,9 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beg <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">; <p>The OTRS Project reports:</p> <blockquote cite="https://www.otrs.com/security-advisory-2014-01-csrf-issue-customer-web-interface/">; - <p>An attacker that managed to take over the session of a logged in customer could create tickets and/or send follow-ups to existing tickets due to missing challenge token checks.</p> + <p>An attacker that managed to take over the session of a logged in customer + could create tickets and/or send follow-ups to existing tickets due to + missing challenge token checks.</p> </blockquote> </body> </description> @@ -269,8 +276,10 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beg there will be a brief interruption of service and the cache will be emptied, causing more traffic to go to the backend. </p> - <p>We are releasing this advisory because restarting from vcl_error{} is both fairly common and documented.</p> - <p>This is purely a denial of service vulnerability, there is no risk of privilege escalation.</p> + <p>We are releasing this advisory because restarting from vcl_error{} is + both fairly common and documented.</p> + <p>This is purely a denial of service vulnerability, there is no risk of + privilege escalation.</p> <p>Workaround</p> <p>Insert this at the top of your VCL file:</p> <pre>
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