From owner-freebsd-security Sat Jan 13 20: 7: 2 2001 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mailhost01.reflexnet.net (mailhost01.reflexnet.net [64.6.192.82]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB1DD37B6A6 for ; Sat, 13 Jan 2001 20:06:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from rfx-64-6-211-149.users.reflexcom.com ([64.6.211.149]) by mailhost01.reflexnet.net with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.5.1877.197.19); Sat, 13 Jan 2001 20:04:58 -0800 Received: (from cjc@localhost) by rfx-64-6-211-149.users.reflexcom.com (8.11.1/8.11.0) id f0E46mR33317; Sat, 13 Jan 2001 20:06:48 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from cjc) Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2001 20:06:48 -0800 From: "Crist J. Clark" To: Webbie Cc: Frank Tobin , Dru , security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: opinions on password policies Message-ID: <20010113200648.K97980@rfx-64-6-211-149.users.reflexco> Reply-To: cjclark@alum.mit.edu References: <20010113165021.I97980@rfx-64-6-211-149.users.reflexco> <58623706.20010113225124@ipfw.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <58623706.20010113225124@ipfw.org>; from pccb@yahoo.com on Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 10:51:24PM -0500 Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org On Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 10:51:24PM -0500, Peter Chiu wrote: > Saturday, January 13, 2001, 7:50:21 PM, you wrote: > > CJC> On Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 05:35:51PM -0600, Frank Tobin wrote: > >> While this may not be applicable to your situation, I feel that the best > >> policy is to demand public-key authentication. The reason for this is to > >> limit the human factor, not demanding the user remember yet another unique > >> password. If forced to remember another password, most users (including > >> myself) will often re-use a password they use at another place. > >> > >> If your system is compromised, you do not to help the attackers, who are > >> now likely, get into other accounts the user might have other places > >> because they reused the pasword. On the flip side, it would be best that > >> if the user was compromised someplace else, it won't help the attackers > >> use the authentication information to get into the victim's account on > >> your system. Public-key systems prevent this sort of "chain-reaction" > >> account breakage. > > CJC> I am not sure I understand your argument here. I your system, how does > CJC> the _user_ authenticate himself? Biometrics? HW token? Smart card? > CJC> Really, no passwords? > > I think he means using a public-key pair without a passphrase. I could > be wrong though. Geez. I hope not. That means there is no user authentication at all. -- Crist J. Clark cjclark@alum.mit.edu To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message