Date: Tue, 29 May 2007 14:29:02 GMT From: Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> To: Perforce Change Reviews <perforce@freebsd.org> Subject: PERFORCE change 120556 for review Message-ID: <200705291429.l4TET2OC057554@repoman.freebsd.org>
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http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=120556 Change 120556 by rwatson@rwatson_zoo on 2007/05/29 14:28:56 Embed audit data for processes directly in process credential rather than into indirect data hung off the process. This means audit information is available in asynchronous contexts, and allows lock-free access to data on a per-thread basis via td_ucred, reducing locking contention for auditing multi-threaded processes and reducing locking overhead for all processes. Sadly, this currently requires a nested include of bsm/audit.h from ucired.h. Affected files ... .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/kern/init_main.c#15 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/kern/kern_exit.c#21 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/kern/kern_fork.c#22 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/kern/kern_prot.c#12 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit.c#43 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit.h#23 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c#28 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h#39 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c#37 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/sys/proc.h#22 edit .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/sys/ucred.h#7 edit Differences ... ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/kern/init_main.c#15 (text+ko) ==== @@ -440,8 +440,7 @@ p->p_ucred->cr_ruidinfo = uifind(0); p->p_ucred->cr_prison = NULL; /* Don't jail it. */ #ifdef AUDIT - audit_proc_alloc(p); - audit_proc_kproc0(p); + audit_cred_kproc0(p->p_ucred); #endif #ifdef MAC mac_create_proc0(p->p_ucred); @@ -706,7 +705,7 @@ mac_create_proc1(newcred); #endif #ifdef AUDIT - audit_proc_init(initproc); + audit_cred_proc1(newcred); #endif initproc->p_ucred = newcred; PROC_UNLOCK(initproc); ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/kern/kern_exit.c#21 (text+ko) ==== @@ -807,9 +807,6 @@ #ifdef MAC mac_destroy_proc(p); #endif -#ifdef AUDIT - audit_proc_free(p); -#endif KASSERT(FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p), ("kern_wait: no residual thread!")); uma_zfree(proc_zone, p); ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/kern/kern_fork.c#22 (text+ko) ==== @@ -279,9 +279,6 @@ #ifdef MAC mac_init_proc(newproc); #endif -#ifdef AUDIT - audit_proc_alloc(newproc); -#endif knlist_init(&newproc->p_klist, &newproc->p_mtx, NULL, NULL, NULL); STAILQ_INIT(&newproc->p_ktr); @@ -511,9 +508,6 @@ mtx_unlock_spin(&sched_lock); td2->td_ucred = crhold(p2->p_ucred); -#ifdef AUDIT - audit_proc_fork(p1, p2); -#endif pargs_hold(p2->p_args); if (flags & RFSIGSHARE) { @@ -752,9 +746,6 @@ #ifdef MAC mac_destroy_proc(newproc); #endif -#ifdef AUDIT - audit_proc_free(newproc); -#endif uma_zfree(proc_zone, newproc); if (p1->p_flag & P_HADTHREADS) { PROC_LOCK(p1); ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/kern/kern_prot.c#12 (text+ko) ==== @@ -1771,6 +1771,9 @@ MALLOC(cr, struct ucred *, sizeof(*cr), M_CRED, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); refcount_init(&cr->cr_ref, 1); +#ifdef AUDIT + audit_cred_init(cr); +#endif #ifdef MAC mac_init_cred(cr); #endif @@ -1812,6 +1815,9 @@ */ if (jailed(cr)) prison_free(cr->cr_prison); +#ifdef AUDIT + audit_cred_destroy(cr); +#endif #ifdef MAC mac_destroy_cred(cr); #endif @@ -1844,6 +1850,9 @@ uihold(dest->cr_ruidinfo); if (jailed(dest)) prison_hold(dest->cr_prison); +#ifdef AUDIT + audit_cred_copy(src, dest); +#endif #ifdef MAC mac_copy_cred(src, dest); #endif ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit.c#43 (text+ko) ==== @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Computer, Inc. - * Copyright (c) 2006 Robert N. M. Watson + * Copyright (c) 2006-2007 Robert N. M. Watson * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ #include <vm/uma.h> static uma_zone_t audit_record_zone; -static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITPROC, "audit_proc", "Audit process storage"); +static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITCRED, "audit_cred", "Audit cred storage"); MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITDATA, "audit_data", "Audit data storage"); MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITPATH, "audit_path", "Audit path storage"); MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITTEXT, "audit_text", "Audit text storage"); @@ -178,15 +178,11 @@ ar->k_ar.ar_subj_ruid = td->td_ucred->cr_ruid; ar->k_ar.ar_subj_rgid = td->td_ucred->cr_rgid; ar->k_ar.ar_subj_egid = td->td_ucred->cr_groups[0]; - PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); - ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid; - ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_asid; + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid; + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_asid; ar->k_ar.ar_subj_pid = td->td_proc->p_pid; - ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_mask; - ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term_addr = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid; - bcopy(td->td_proc->p_comm, ar->k_ar.ar_subj_comm, MAXCOMLEN); - PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); - + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_mask; + ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term_addr = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_termid; return (0); } @@ -483,11 +479,11 @@ * Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable * event mask or the process audit mask. */ - auid = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid; + auid = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid; if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID) aumask = &audit_nae_mask; else - aumask = &td->td_proc->p_au->ai_mask; + aumask = &td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_mask; /* * Allocate an audit record, if preselection allows it, and store @@ -551,88 +547,68 @@ } /* - * Allocate storage for a new process (init, or otherwise). + * Copy audit state from an existing credential to a new credential. */ void -audit_proc_alloc(struct proc *p) +audit_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest) { - KASSERT(p->p_au == NULL, ("audit_proc_alloc: p->p_au != NULL (%d)", - p->p_pid)); - p->p_au = malloc(sizeof(*(p->p_au)), M_AUDITPROC, M_WAITOK); + bcopy(&src->cr_audit, &dest->cr_audit, sizeof(dest->cr_audit)); } /* - * Allocate storage for a new thread. + * Free audit state from a credential when the credential is freed. */ void -audit_thread_alloc(struct thread *td) +audit_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred) { - td->td_ar = NULL; + bzero(&cred->cr_audit, sizeof(cred->cr_audit)); } /* - * Thread destruction. + * Allocate audit state for a new credential. */ void -audit_thread_free(struct thread *td) +audit_cred_init(struct ucred *cred) { - KASSERT(td->td_ar == NULL, ("audit_thread_free: td_ar != NULL")); + bzero(&cred->cr_audit, sizeof(cred->cr_audit)); } /* * Initialize audit information for the first kernel process (proc 0) and for * the first user process (init). - * - * XXX It is not clear what the initial values should be for audit ID, - * session ID, etc. */ void -audit_proc_kproc0(struct proc *p) +audit_cred_kproc0(struct ucred *cred) { - KASSERT(p->p_au != NULL, ("audit_proc_kproc0: p->p_au == NULL (%d)", - p->p_pid)); - bzero(p->p_au, sizeof(*(p)->p_au)); } void -audit_proc_init(struct proc *p) +audit_cred_proc1(struct ucred *cred) { - KASSERT(p->p_au != NULL, ("audit_proc_init: p->p_au == NULL (%d)", - p->p_pid)); - bzero(p->p_au, sizeof(*(p)->p_au)); - p->p_au->ai_auid = AU_DEFAUDITID; + cred->cr_audit.ai_auid = AU_DEFAUDITID; } /* - * Copy the audit info from the parent process to the child process when - * a fork takes place. + * Allocate storage for a new thread. */ void -audit_proc_fork(struct proc *parent, struct proc *child) +audit_thread_alloc(struct thread *td) { - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(parent, MA_OWNED); - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(child, MA_OWNED); - KASSERT(parent->p_au != NULL, - ("audit_proc_fork: parent->p_au == NULL (%d)", parent->p_pid)); - KASSERT(child->p_au != NULL, - ("audit_proc_fork: child->p_au == NULL (%d)", child->p_pid)); - bcopy(parent->p_au, child->p_au, sizeof(*child->p_au)); + td->td_ar = NULL; } /* - * Free the auditing structure for the process. + * Thread destruction. */ void -audit_proc_free(struct proc *p) +audit_thread_free(struct thread *td) { - KASSERT(p->p_au != NULL, ("p->p_au == NULL (%d)", p->p_pid)); - free(p->p_au, M_AUDITPROC); - p->p_au = NULL; + KASSERT(td->td_ar == NULL, ("audit_thread_free: td_ar != NULL")); } ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit.h#23 (text+ko) ==== @@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ void audit_arg_argv(char *argv, int argc, int length); void audit_arg_envv(char *envv, int envc, int length); void audit_sysclose(struct thread *td, int fd); -void audit_proc_alloc(struct proc *p); -void audit_proc_kproc0(struct proc *p); -void audit_proc_init(struct proc *p); -void audit_proc_fork(struct proc *parent, struct proc *child); -void audit_proc_free(struct proc *p); +void audit_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest); +void audit_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred); +void audit_cred_init(struct ucred *cred); +void audit_cred_kproc0(struct ucred *cred); +void audit_cred_proc1(struct ucred *cred); void audit_thread_alloc(struct thread *td); void audit_thread_free(struct thread *td); @@ -216,10 +216,6 @@ #else /* !AUDIT */ -void audit_proc_init(struct proc *p); -void audit_proc_fork(struct proc *parent, struct proc *child); -void audit_proc_free(struct proc *p); - #define AUDIT_ARG(op, args...) do { \ } while (0) ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c#28 (text+ko) ==== @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * - * $FreeBSD: src/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c,v 1.11 2007/04/13 14:55:19 csjp Exp $ + * $FreeBSD: src/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c,v 1.10 2007/02/20 13:38:11 rwatson Exp $ */ #include <sys/param.h> @@ -365,16 +365,16 @@ if (ar == NULL) return; - ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = p->p_au->ai_auid; + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = p->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid; ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = p->p_ucred->cr_uid; ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0]; ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = p->p_ucred->cr_ruid; ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = p->p_ucred->cr_rgid; - ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = p->p_au->ai_asid; - ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr = p->p_au->ai_termid; + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = p->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_asid; + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr = p->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_termid; ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = p->p_pid; ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_EUID | ARG_EGID | ARG_RUID | - ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID_ADDR | ARG_PID | ARG_PROCESS); + ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID | ARG_PID | ARG_PROCESS); } void ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h#39 (text+ko) ==== @@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ pid_t ar_subj_pid; struct au_tid ar_subj_term; struct au_tid_addr ar_subj_term_addr; - char ar_subj_comm[MAXCOMLEN + 1]; struct au_mask ar_subj_amask; /* Operation arguments. */ ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c#37 (text+ko) ==== @@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ int auditon(struct thread *td, struct auditon_args *uap) { + struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; int error; union auditon_udata udata; struct proc *tp; @@ -324,47 +325,53 @@ case A_GETPINFO: if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1) return (EINVAL); - if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL) return (EINVAL); if (p_cansee(td, tp) != 0) { PROC_UNLOCK(tp); return (EINVAL); } - - if (tp->p_au->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) { + if (tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) { PROC_UNLOCK(tp); return (EINVAL); } - udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid = tp->p_au->ai_auid; + udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid = + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid; udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success = - tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_success; + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success; udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure = - tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_failure; + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure; udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.machine = - tp->p_au->ai_termid.at_addr[0]; + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0]; udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port = - (dev_t)tp->p_au->ai_termid.at_port; - udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid = tp->p_au->ai_asid; + (dev_t)tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port; + udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid = + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_asid; PROC_UNLOCK(tp); break; case A_SETPMASK: if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1) return (EINVAL); - - if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL) + newcred = crget(); + if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL) { + crfree(newcred); return (EINVAL); + } if (p_cansee(td, tp) != 0) { PROC_UNLOCK(tp); + crfree(newcred); return (EINVAL); } - - tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_success = + oldcred = tp->p_ucred; + crcopy(newcred, oldcred); + newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success = udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success; - tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_failure = + newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure = udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure; + td->td_proc->p_ucred = newcred; PROC_UNLOCK(tp); + crfree(oldcred); break; case A_SETFSIZE: @@ -384,13 +391,16 @@ return (EINVAL); if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid)) == NULL) return (EINVAL); - udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_auid = tp->p_au->ai_auid; + udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_auid = + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid; udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_success = - tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_success; + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success; udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_failure = - tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_failure; - udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_termid = tp->p_au->ai_termid; - udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_asid = tp->p_au->ai_asid; + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure; + udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_termid = + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_termid; + udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_asid = + tp->p_ucred->cr_audit.ai_asid; PROC_UNLOCK(tp); break; @@ -442,64 +452,46 @@ getauid(struct thread *td, struct getauid_args *uap) { int error; - au_id_t id; if (jailed(td->td_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT); if (error) return (error); - - /* - * XXX: Integer read on static pointer dereference: doesn't need - * locking? - */ - PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); - id = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid; - PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); - return copyout(&id, uap->auid, sizeof(id)); + return (copyout(&td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid, uap->auid, + sizeof(td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid))); } /* ARGSUSED */ int setauid(struct thread *td, struct setauid_args *uap) { + struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; + au_id_t id; int error; - au_id_t id; if (jailed(td->td_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); - error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT); - if (error) - return (error); - error = copyin(uap->auid, &id, sizeof(id)); if (error) return (error); - audit_arg_auid(id); - -#ifdef MAC - error = mac_check_proc_setauid(td->td_ucred, id); + newcred = crget(); + PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); + oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred; + crcopy(newcred, oldcred); + error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0); if (error) - return (error); -#endif - - /* - * XXX: Integer write on static pointer dereference: doesn't need - * locking? - * - * XXXAUDIT: Might need locking to serialize audit events in the same - * order as change events? Or maybe that's an under-solveable - * problem. - * - * XXXRW: Test privilege while holding the proc lock? - */ - PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); - td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid = id; + goto fail; + newcred->cr_audit.ai_auid = id; + td->td_proc->p_ucred = newcred; PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); - + crfree(oldcred); return (0); +fail: + PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); + crfree(newcred); + return (error); } /* @@ -517,108 +509,108 @@ error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT); if (error) return (error); - - PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); - if (td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) { - PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); - return (E2BIG); - } bzero(&ai, sizeof(ai)); - ai.ai_auid = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid; - ai.ai_mask = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_mask; - ai.ai_asid = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_asid; - ai.ai_termid.machine = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_addr[0]; - ai.ai_termid.port = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_port; - PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); - - return (copyout(&ai, uap->auditinfo, sizeof(ai))); + ai.ai_auid = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid; + ai.ai_mask = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_mask; + ai.ai_asid = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_asid; + ai.ai_termid.machine = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0]; + ai.ai_termid.port = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port; + return (copyout(&ai, uap->auditinfo, sizeof(&ai))); } /* ARGSUSED */ int setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap) { + struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; struct auditinfo ai; int error; if (jailed(td->td_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); - error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT); - if (error) - return (error); - error = copyin(uap->auditinfo, &ai, sizeof(ai)); if (error) return (error); - audit_arg_auditinfo(&ai); - + newcred = crget(); + PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); + oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred; + crcopy(newcred, oldcred); #ifdef MAC - error = mac_check_proc_setaudit(td->td_ucred, &ai); + error = mac_check_proc_setaudit(oldcred, &ai); if (error) - return (error); + goto fail; #endif - - /* - * XXXRW: Test privilege while holding the proc lock? - */ - PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); - bzero(td->td_proc->p_au, sizeof(struct auditinfo_addr)); - td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid = ai.ai_auid; - td->td_proc->p_au->ai_mask = ai.ai_mask; - td->td_proc->p_au->ai_asid = ai.ai_asid; - td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_addr[0] = ai.ai_termid.machine; - td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_port = ai.ai_termid.port; - td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4; + error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0); + if (error) + goto fail; + bzero(&newcred->cr_audit, sizeof(newcred->cr_audit)); + newcred->cr_audit.ai_auid = ai.ai_auid; + newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask = ai.ai_mask; + newcred->cr_audit.ai_asid = ai.ai_asid; + newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0] = ai.ai_termid.machine; + newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port = ai.ai_termid.port; + newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4; + td->td_proc->p_ucred = newcred; PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); - + crfree(oldcred); return (0); +fail: + PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); + crfree(newcred); + return (error); } /* ARGSUSED */ int getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap) { - struct auditinfo_addr aia; int error; if (jailed(td->td_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); + if (uap->length < sizeof(*uap->auditinfo_addr)) + return (EOVERFLOW); error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT); if (error) return (error); - if (uap->length < sizeof(aia)) - return (EOVERFLOW); - PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); - aia = *td->td_proc->p_au; - PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); - return (copyout(&aia, uap->auditinfo_addr, sizeof(aia))); + return (copyout(&td->td_ucred->cr_audit, uap->auditinfo_addr, + sizeof(*uap->auditinfo_addr))); } /* ARGSUSED */ int setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap) { + struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; struct auditinfo_addr aia; int error; if (jailed(td->td_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); - error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT); + error = copyin(uap->auditinfo_addr, &aia, sizeof(aia)); if (error) return (error); - + /* XXXRW: Audit argument. */ + newcred = crget(); + PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); + oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred; + crcopy(newcred, oldcred); #ifdef MAC - error = mac_check_proc_setaudit(td->td_ucred, NULL); + error = mac_check_proc_setaudit(oldcred, NULL); if (error) - return (error); + goto fail; #endif - error = copyin(uap->auditinfo_addr, &aia, sizeof(aia)); + error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0); if (error) - return (error); - PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); - *td->td_proc->p_au = aia; + goto fail; + newcred->cr_audit = aia; + td->td_proc->p_ucred = newcred; PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); + crfree(oldcred); + return (0); +fail: + crfree(newcred); return (error); } @@ -662,17 +654,7 @@ return (error); vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd); vp = nd.ni_vp; -#ifdef MAC - error = mac_check_system_auditctl(td->td_ucred, vp); - VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); - if (error) { - vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, td->td_ucred, td); - VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked); - return (error); - } -#else VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); -#endif NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF); if (vp->v_type != VREG) { vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, td->td_ucred, td); @@ -758,23 +740,4 @@ return (ENOSYS); } - -void -audit_proc_init(struct proc *p) -{ - -} - -void -audit_proc_fork(struct proc *parent, struct proc *child) -{ - -} - -void -audit_proc_free(struct proc *p) -{ - -} - #endif /* AUDIT */ ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/sys/proc.h#22 (text+ko) ==== @@ -150,7 +150,6 @@ * either lock is sufficient for read access, but both locks must be held * for write access. */ -struct auditinfo; struct kaudit_record; struct td_sched; struct nlminfo; @@ -579,7 +578,6 @@ struct p_sched *p_sched; /* (*) Scheduler-specific data. */ STAILQ_HEAD(, ktr_request) p_ktr; /* (o) KTR event queue. */ LIST_HEAD(, mqueue_notifier) p_mqnotifier; /* (c) mqueue notifiers.*/ - struct auditinfo_addr *p_au; /* (c) Process audit properties. */ }; #define p_session p_pgrp->pg_session ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/audit3/sys/sys/ucred.h#7 (text+ko) ==== @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ #ifndef _SYS_UCRED_H_ #define _SYS_UCRED_H_ +#include <bsm/audit.h> + /* * Credentials. * @@ -55,6 +57,7 @@ struct prison *cr_prison; /* jail(2) */ #define cr_endcopy cr_label struct label *cr_label; /* MAC label */ + struct auditinfo_addr cr_audit; /* Audit properties. */ }; #define NOCRED ((struct ucred *)0) /* no credential available */ #define FSCRED ((struct ucred *)-1) /* filesystem credential */
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